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REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS
PRACTICING BEFORE
FEDERAL AGENCIES
Michael P. Cox*
Attorneyspracticingbeforefederal agencies currently are regulatedin a variety
of ways. Traditionally,state barcounselandlicensingauthoritiesregulateattorneys;
however, severalfederalagencies have begun to regulateattorneyspracticingbefore
then. This Article examinesthe currentregulatoryschemes and the numerous alternativesproposed by the American Bar Association and others. The author initially
determines thatfederalagencies have authority to regulateattorneys. To analyze the
problems surroundingagency regulation,the authorexamines three aspects ofsupervision: admission requirements,standardsof conduct, and discipline. While discussing these areas,the authorproposesseveralamendments to the Agency PracticeAct
and the Ethics in Government Act. He advocates that Congress vest authority to set
standardsof conduct in the Offce of Government Ethics andthat thefederaldistrict
courts adjudicate most cases of attorney misconduct.

*

Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. B.S., University of

Kentucky (1965); J.D., University of Kentucky (1968); LL.M., Columbia University (1974);
J.S.D., Columbia University (1981).
Although this Article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS) and reflects the contributions of many persons and sources,
the views expressed are the author's and should not be attributed to particular persons or
sources or the ACUS, unless otherwise indicated. See infra note 13. The author gives
special recognition to the following individuals for their continuous interest in and assistance to this Article: Howard C. Anderson, Chairman, Administrative Law Committee,
ABA Section of Public Utilities Law; Herbert E. Forrest; Paul Gonson, Solicitor, Securities
and Exchange Commission; Thomas Lumbard; Timothy K. McPike, Discipline Counsel,
ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline (on behalf of Michael Franck, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline); and Margery H. Waxman,
Deputy General Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury. The author also expresses appreciation to the University of Oklahoma College of Law and in particular to
Dean Wayne E. Alley, Beverly K. Mitchell, and Paula J. Wesson for their support of this
Article.
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INTRODUCTION

SINCE THE 1930's, Congress and governmental and nongovernmental entities have addressed the regulation of attorneys
practicing before federal agencies on a number of occasions.I Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act details an individual's right to counsel when appearing before an administrative
agency;2 however, the Act is silent on regulation of attorneys
themselves. 3 The Attorney General'sManualon the Administrative
Procedure Act 4 explains that "the legislative history [of section
6(a)] leaves no doubt that the Congress intended to keep unchanged the agencies' existing powers to regulate practice before
1. In addition to enactment of the Agency Practice Act, Pub. L. No. 89-332, 79 Stat.
1281 (1965) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1982)), Congress has considered numerous other bills. See, e.g., S.262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1408 (1979); S.
2374, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 13,161 (1959); H.R. 7092, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
105 CONG. REC. 8009 (1959); H.R. 6774, 86th Cong., IstSess., 105 CONG. REc. 7107
(1959); S.600, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 873 (1959); H.R. 7006, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., 103 CONG. REc. 5947 (1957); S. 932, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 CONG. REC. 1063,
1650 (1957); H.R. 3350, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 CONG. REC. 858 (1957); H.R. 3349, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., 103 CONG. REC. 858 (1957); H.R. 8201, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG.
REC. 5749, 9729, 11225, 11887 (1950); H.R. 4446, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REC. 1987,
3420 (1950), 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC. 5382, 8400, 8954 (1949); S.746, 81st Cong., IstSess.,
95 CONG. REc. 671 (1949); H.R. 7100, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 9785 (1948);
H.R. 2657, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 2343 (1947); H.R. 3089, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 4038 (1945); S. 740, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 2168 (1945);
S.572, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 1211 (1945); H.R. 1387, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.,
91 CONG. REC. 230 (1945); H.R. 1206, 79th Cong., IstSess., 91 CONG. REc. 126 (1945); S.
92, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 78 (1945); H.R. 643, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91
CONG. REc. 29 (1945); H.R. 339, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REC. 23 (1945); H.R.
5277, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 CONG. REC. 7481 (1944); H.R. 5237, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 90
CONG. REc. 7302 (1944); S. 1945, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 CONG. REc. 4844 (1944); H.R.
4470, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 CONG. REC. 3028 (1944); H.R. 2323, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89
CONG. REc. 2670 (1943); H.R. 94, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 19 (1943); H.R.
2526, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. REC. 223 (1941); H.R. 605, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87
CONG. REc. 16 (1941); H.R. 4798, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 CONG. REC. 2331 (1939); H.R.
9635, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 CONG. REC. 2485 (1938); S.2944, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79
CONG. REC. 8366, 11275, 12063 (1935); see also Ethics in Government Act, § 501(a), 18
U.S.C. § 207 (1982) (disqualifying former federal and District of Columbia officers and
employees from and establishing penalties for participation in agency, judicial, and military matters in which they previously participated as government officers or employees).
See infra note 122, for a discussion of the 96th Congress' consideration of S.262. For a
summary of the ABA's activity during this time, see infra notes 8 & 10.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
3. Id §§ 551-59.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRA-

TIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter cited as APA MANUAL]. The Supreme Court
gives "some deference [to the Manual] because of the role played by the Department of
...Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102-03 n.22
Justice in drafting the legislation.
(1981) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978)).
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them. [Congress decided that] the subject should be covered by

separate legislation." 5
On August 11, 1982, the ABA House of Delegates considered

two proposals relating to regulation of attorneys practicing before
federal agencies. The ABA Standing Committee on Professional
Discipline recommended one proposal,6 whereas ten organizations, including nine ABA affiliates, developed the second proposal, the Waxman/Forrest Proposal.7 The ABA's current interest

in discipline of attorneys practicing before federal agencies surfaced in early 1979 but intensified on August 5, 1980 when its
House of Delegates adopted the following resolution:'
5. APA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 65.
6. ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter cited as Franck Proposal]. Michael Franck was the Chairman of the ABA Standing
Committee during formulation of the proposal, which includes Rules for Federal Agency
Discipline.
7. ABA Sections of Admin. Law, Natural Resources Law, & Pub. Util. Law, & Fed.
Communications Bar Ass'n, Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 1982) (on file with the
Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter cited as Waxman/Forrest
Proposal]. Margery H. Waxman and Herbert E. Forrest were the principal drafters of the
proposal. During its development, Ms. Waxman was Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Mr. Forrest was a member of the Washington, D.C., law firm of
Steptoe & Johnson Chartered. The following organizations helped develop the proposal:
the ABA Sections of Administrative Law; Corporation, Banking and Business Law; Natural Resources Law; Patent, Trademarks and Copyright Law; Public Contract Law; Public
Utility Law; and Taxation; the ABA Special Committee on Lawyers in Government; the
ABA Judicial Administration Division; and the Federal Communications Bar Association.
8. The ABA has shown periodic interest in the regulation of attorneys practicing
before federal agencies. See, e.g., Letter from Edward W. Kuhn to Rep. Edwin Willis,
U.S. Congress (Sept. 17, 1965) (endorsing Agency Practice Act), reprintedin 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4179; ABA, 81 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
379-80, 495-96, 514-17 (1956) (endorsing Hoover Commission proposals). For further discussion of the Hoover Commission proposals, see infra note 20.
Discipline of attorneys practicing before federal agencies appeared on the agenda of the
January 18-20, 1979 meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline.
An attorney disciplinary action before the Interstate Commerce Commission, In re Vandegrift, ICC ex parte No. 352 (Nov. 3, 1980), prompted this action. The Standing Committee
noted its concern over the lack of uniformity in attorney disciplinary procedures among the
various federal agencies, the ICC's apparent failure to provide respondent with due process, and the ICC's broad claim of authority over attorney discipline. See also In re Carter,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (Mar. 7, 1979) (administrative
law judge recommended suspension of two attorneys from SEC practice for violating Securities Exchange Act and engaging in unethical professional conduct), rev'dand dismissed,
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
At the April 20-21, 1979, meeting of the Standing Committee, discussion of agency
regulation of attorneys included the Vandegry case, concern over the Securities and Exchange Commission's actions and the implications of Carter, the authority of agencies to
discipline attorneys, the standards applicable in attorney disciplinary actions by federal
agencies, and the chilling effect of an agency's being both prosecutor and judge in a disci-
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Resolved, That inasmuch as the public interest in the effective administration of justice requires diligent and independent

representation by counsel, the American Bar Association perceives dangers in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by ad-

ministrative agencies over lawyers who represent clients with
respect to client conduct subject to regulations by those agencies (other than authority immediately necessary to maintain
order in or the integrity of proceedings pending before them);

and
Resolved, That the American Bar Association undertake the
development of a model enforcement mechanism for the discipline of lawyers who practice before federal and state administrative agencies, through efforts involving interested
administrative agencies and Association entities, to be coordi-

nated by the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline. 9
Between the summer of 1980 and the summer of 1982, the Standing Committee developed the Franck Proposal, t° consisting primarily of proposed Rules for Federal Agency Discipline, forty-six
pages of definitions, twenty-four rules, and commentary. In early
1982, ten organizations developed, circulated, refined, and endorsed an alternative to the Franck Proposal." In addition to the
ABA's organized attention to the subject, many individuals have
addressed issues related to regulation of attorneys practicing
before federal agencies. 12
The recent interest in agency regulation of attorneys has focused attention on what federal agencies have or have not done to
plinary action. During the remainder of 1979, the Standing Committee prepared a recommendation on federal agencies' discipline of attorneys. After other ABA entities studied,
discussed, and revised the recommendation, the ABA House of Delegates adopted it on
August 5, 1980. See Letter & enclosures from Timothy K. McPike, Discipline Counsel,
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, to the author (May 25, 1982) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) (setting out this chronology of
events); infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
9. ABA, Reports of Committees and Commissions, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE

HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Aug. 5-6, 1980, at 23. The language finally adopted by the 1980
House of Delegates varies slightly from that initially recommended by the Standing Committee in its 1980 report to the House. See infra note 22.
10. The proposal represents a distillation of the views of a number of persons and
organizations. The Standing Committee held three conferences in Washington, D.C.,
(Sept. 23, 1980; Dec. 16, 1980; and July 20, 1981) to obtain the participants' perspectives
and comments on the proposed Rules for Federal Agency Discipline. In addition, it received responses from numerous individuals and entities, including submissions from several ABA sections, federal agencies, specialized bar associations, the Conference of
Administrative Law Judges, and members of the National Organization of Bar Counsel.
The Standing Committee submitted its final recommendation to the House of Delegates on
August 11, 1982.
11. See Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7.
12. See infra appendix D.
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warrant the increased opposition to agency regulation of attor-

neys. Many comments received by the author

3

demonstrate the

4
nature and depth of the bar's concern over this issue.1

To illuminate the ABA's and individual bar members' conflict
with federal agencies, this Article analyzes the three aspects of
agency regulation of attorneys: admission requirements,"' stan-

dards for regulating conduct,' 6 and discipline."' Because the prac13. The author received comments while undertaking a study for the ACUS beginning on April 6, 1982. The study involved corresponding with numerous practitioners, law
professors specializing in administrative law or professional responsibility, and current and
past ACUS members. The author sent one questionnaire (the Federal Questionnaire) to
the general counsels and chief administrative law judges of major federal agencies and a
second questionnaire (the State Questionnaire) to all state bar counsel. See infra appendix
A, for a copy of the Federal Questionnaire; infra appendix B, for a copy of the State Questionnaire. The responses are on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review. When the
author refers to an individual response to one of the questionnaires, he will refer the reader
to the particular question containing that point in the response. As the information contained in the responses was not validated statistically, the responses only serve as an indication of the views of persons closely associated with disciplinary matters (State
Questionnaire) or the federal administrative process (Federal Questionnaire). The author
interviewed persons selected for their expertise and contrasting perspectives on discipline
of attorneys practicing before federal agencies, and attended the ABA Annual Convention
on August 11, 1982, to observe the House of Delegates' debate on the Franck and Waxman/Forrest Proposals. In addition, numerous persons furnished copies of correspondence, documents, and other materials relevant to the inquiry.
14. The following excerpts from two letters exemplify this concern:
We have only this week obtained from the [agency name deleted], under the
Federal Privacy Act, the memorandum which formed the basis for the finding of
probable cause. It is so vicious, and so wrong-headed in its legal analysis, that we
hardly know whether to laugh or cry. It demonstrates anew the dangers of having
disciplinary matters handled by bar counsel who are neither impartial nor familiar with the law in the area, and who are not only willing but eager to institute a
public proceeding first, and to investigate later.
Letter from Thomas Lumbard to Marcia L. Proctor 1-2 (Jan. 12, 1979) (on file with the
Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
I have received information leading me to believe that one agency's disciplinary
investigators and counsel encourage attorneys in [agency name deleted], handling
unrelated matters in which lawyers who are under disciplinary investigation are
opposing them, to look at the files in the disciplinary investigations. The [position
of official deleted] was quoted to me as having said, urging a staff attorney to
review the file on his adversary, "You should take advantage of every opportunity
to learn about your opponent:' The staff attorney declined the invitiation in this
instance, but was it the first time? Or the last?
So we are not just talking about a theoretical or imaginary conflict between
regulatory prosecutive zeal and disciplinary confidentiality. The conflict is not
just a potential one, inherent in the structure; it is real. That lawyers acting as
agency bar counsel would countenance such shenanigans makes my blood boil.
Letter from Thomas Lumbard to Marcia L. Proctor (Sept. 19, 1979) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS). Although the same person wrote both letters
in 1979, other individuals expressed similar concerns about agency disciplinary procedures
and practices to the author during the course of this study.
15. See infra notes 58-99 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 100-75 and accompanying text.
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tice of law has traditionally been within the province of the
states, t" the Article also examines the scope of the federal government's authority to impose restrictions on attorneys in the administrative process.' 9 In addition, the Article seeks to determine
whether federal agencies have acted improperly in their regulation
of attorneys and to present solutions to existing problems in this
area.
I.

AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE
ATTORNEYS PRACTICING BEFORE FEDERAL AGENCIES

As one examines the authority of the federal government to
regulate attorneys practicing before federal agencies, one must ask
why the federal government would want to assume responsibilities
normally performed by state bar counsel and licensing authorities.
One simple reason is that a jurisdictional gap exists in the discipline of attorneys practicing before federal agencies. As noted by
the Hoover Commission Task Force:
An attorney practicing before Federal agencies may escape
effective disciplinary action by the courts of his State because of
his absence from that jurisdiction. Such an attorney in Federal
administrative practice who moves to Washington, D.C., often
cuts all ties with the State which has admitted him to the practice of law. Only in exceptional cases is such an attorney likely
to be subject to disciplinary proceedings in that State for unprofessional conduct before Federal agencies in Washington.
Moreover, disbarment proceedings will not be available against
him in the District of Columbia where he is not a member of
the bar of any trial court in the District. The result is a hiatus
in the effective disciplining of many lawyers engaged in the administrative law practice. °
17. See infra notes 174-217 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1978); In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93
(1975); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
19. See infra notes 20-57 and accompanying text.
20. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T,
TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVS. & PROCEDURES, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCE-

DURES 308 (1955) [hereinafter cited as HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT]; see

also

UNITED STATES COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, LE-

GAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 37-40 (1955) (describing ability of attorneys practicing

before federal agencies to escape disciplinary action) [hereinafter cited as HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT]. To eliminate this "hiatus," the Hoover Commission included as recommendation 26:
An attorney-at-law who has the privilege of representation before any agency
of the United States should be subject to disciplinary control (1) by a Federal
Grievance Committee through proceedings in a United States district court, and
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Although the Task Force made this statement in 1955, the Clark
Committee reached the same conclusion in 197021 and the ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline's 1980 report to
the House of Delegates contained similar indications.2 2 The
House of Delegates adopted the recommendation accompanying
the latter report and asked the Standing Committee to develop "a
model enforcement mechanism for the discipline of lawyers who
practice before federal . . . agencies."' 23 Thus, if the states effectively processed allegations of attorney misconduct before federal
agencies, federal disciplinary actions arguably would be unneces-

sary. A possible exception would be when an attorney acted con(2) by each agency, with authority to suspend him from practice before that
agency for not more than 1 year.
Id. at 40. For a description of the authority of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law to investigate persons not licensed to practice
in the District, see Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
21. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 67-70 (June 1970)
[hereinafer cited as CLARK REPORT].
22. ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Report to the House of Delegates 4 (Aug. 1980) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 ABA Standing Committee Report]. The report states:
Lawyer discipline has traditionally been left to the principal jurisdiction of the
several states. But several potential problems arise in merely relying upon existing mechanisms for disciplinary enforcement to govern practice before administrative agencies, notably:
I. The extent to which state disciplinary agencies lack adequate staff and
financial resources to serve as the principal vehicles for administering discipline over federal agency practitioners.
2. The extent to which the high degree of expertise often involved in administrative agency practice, and disciplinary matters arising therefrom,
might require that the customary state agency structure be supplemented.
Id. at 5.
23. ABA, Reports of Committees and Commissions, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE

HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Aug. 5-6, 1980, at 23; see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
In 1981 the General Counsel and Solicitor of the SEC agreed that effective regulation of
attorneys practicing before federal agencies required some mechanism beyond state disciplinary proceedings. R. Ferrara & P. Gonson, Submission of the General Counsel and
Solicitor of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline Concerning Discipline of Lawyers who
Practice Before Federal Agencies 4-5 (Mar. 19, 1981) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter cited as Ferrara/Gonson Proposal]. The
two officials noted that
state and local bar authorities traditionally have held-and still hold- the primary responsibility for the discipline of lawyers. However, as a growing number
of lawyers engage in an essentially federal practice, there is a greater need for a
complementary disciplinary authority that focuses primarily on federal practice .... [M]any state disciplinary authorities lack extensive budgets, staff, and
federal practice expertise. It is fair to state that misconduct in federal practice
may receive a low priority among the numerous competing local issues.
Id. at 4.
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tumaciously during the course of an agency proceeding. z4 Since
effective state regulation of attorneys practicing before federal
agencies remains undocumented and a need exists for regulation,25 one must determine whether federal agencies have authority to assume responsibility in this specialized attorney discipline
area.
A.

ConstitutionalArguments Against FederalAuthority

Observers have proffered two constitutional arguments concerning the federal government's lack of authority in this area.
The first argument attacks the federal government's power to regulate 6 and the second challenges federal agencies' authority to
regulate.27
The first argument proceeds from the premise that only the
state or federal judiciary may regulate attorneys; however, despite
their quasi-judicial aspects, agencies are not courts and thus do
not have inherent authority to regulate attorneys. 28 This argument
then maintains that legislatures have no authority to regulate the
legal profession except perhaps to aid the judiciary in the performance of its responsibility. 29 Finally, since the Constitution
24. Federal agencies could handle at least two other categories of misconduct. The
first is when the attorney acts in a representative capacity but does not commit the misconduct in the physical presence of the agency. See, e.g., Koden v. United States, 564 F.2d 228
(7th Cir. 1977); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The second involves an
attorney's failure to fulfill an agency's special concept of professional resposibility relating
to its substantive regulatory responsibilities. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg.
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); ABA Subcomm. on Fed. Agency Discipline, Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Draft Position Paper at I (Oct. 1979) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) (suggesting these distinctions).
25. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. In addition, the responses to the
State Questionnaire from state bar counsel (state officials who investigate and process complaints against attorneys) suggest that state disciplinary systems may not effectively regulate attorneys practicing before federal agencies. See infra appendix B; supra note 13.
26. For a presentation of this argument, see Letter from Thomas Lumbard to Senator
John C. Culver 2 (Aug. 31, 1979) (on file wth the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the
ACUS).
27. See, e.g., 1980 ABA Standing Committee Report, supra note 22, at 2-5; Franck
Proposal, supra note 6, at ii-iii.
28. See, e.g., Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D.D.C. 1952) (stating that authority to regulate attorneys appearing before agency is not an inherent power but one
derived from legislative authority creating agency); In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp,
82,124 at 81,993 (July !1, 1979)
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
(Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting) (stating that absent specific legislative grant of authority to
agency, attorney discipline is responsibility of judiciary).
29. See Note, Representation of Clients before Administrative Agencies: Authorized or
UnauthorizedPractice of Law?, 15 VAL. U.L. REv. 567, 584-599 (1981) (discussing four
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does not expressly reserve the function of regulating attorneys to
the federal government, the tenth amendment requires that the
responsibility remain with the various states.30
Under this analysis, the federal government has no authority
to regulate attorneys practicing before federal agencies unless the
article III courts exercise authority as part of their inherent powers. Despite the theoretical persuasiveness of this rationale, the
federal courts or Congress are unlikely to disregard longstanding
congressional3 t and judicial precedent 32 acknowledging the federal government's authority to regulate attorneys practicing before
federal agencies.
The second constitutional argument principally maintains that
vesting agencies with authority to regulate attorneys would constitute an impermissible combination of functions in violation of due
process.33 To a lesser extent, it claims that agency authority
would unconstitutionally interfere with the attorney/client relationship so as to deny effective counsel. 34 The ABA Standing
theories of legislative power to regulate legal profession: judiciary and legislature have
concurrent jurisdiction; legislature may pass laws to aid judiciary; legislature has no jurisdiction; and legislature is supreme, with judiciary secondary).
30. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CO sT. amend. X.
31. For express legislative grants of authority, see 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976) (Department of the Treasury); 35 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32 (1976) (Patent and Trademark Office); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1976) (Department of the Interior); see also Agency Practice Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.
§ 500(b), (d), (e) (1982) (providing general rules for practice before a federal agency).
32. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Goldsmith v.
United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d
570 (2d Cir. 1979); Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977);
Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701
(D.D.C. 1957); Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952); Phillips v. Ballinger, 37
App. D.C. 46 (1911); Garfield v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 32 App. D.C. 109 (1908); infra
notes 56-57 and accompanying text (examining Sperry and Goldsmith).
33. The proponents of the argument contend that combining client regulatory responsibilities and disciplinary power over attorneys in the same agency creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in the administrative process in violation of the fifth amendment. But see
Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976); Larkin
v. Withrow, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
34. See, e.g., R. Karmel, Remarks to the 2nd Annual Corporate Counsel Seminar for
In-House Counsel 19 (Mar. 6, 1980) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and
the ACUS) (agencies' obligating attorney to serve public interests beyond and perhaps inconsistent with client's raises civil liberty questions). Commissioner Karmel seems to be
connecting the right to effective counsel and the Bill of Rights. The sixth amendment guarantees the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Because
regulation of a client is not generally criminal in nature, the sixth amendment does not
seem to require assistance of counsel throughout the administrative process. Due process
could include the right to counsel in a noncriminal proceeding. This right is not, however,
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Committee on Professional Discipline stated the argument
concisely:
The merger of substantive and disciplinary jurisdiction in the
same administrative agency poses a two-fold threat of serious
harm to the client.
. First, the lawyer's disclosures about the representation
which are required to defend against the misconduct
charges must be made, not to disciplinary counsel disinterested in the underlying client matter, but to employees of
the client's adversary, the agency. The disclosures thus become available to the agency for use against the client in
the underlying matter.
Second, the practitioner who knows that his/her ability
to earn a living can be terminated by the very agency he
was retained by the client to deal with or resist, may very
well temper his/her representation-consciously or unconsciously-to a level of vigor and diligence less than the client's cause warrants, so as not to arouse the agency's
displeasure against himself.35
The first part of the argument is not easy to counter. In
Withrow v. Larkin,3 6 the Supreme Court addressed the separation
of functions question. This landmark decision did not involve the
an inevitable requisite of administrative due process, although the right may exist by statute. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, § 6(a), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982); see also
Friendly, "Some Kind ofHearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1287-91 (1975). The concern
does not therefore seem to be of constitutional dimension but rather one of confidentiality
and privilege.
When Commissioner Karmel made her remarks in 1980, she did not have the benefit of
a major Supreme Court decision involving federal agencies and the corporate attorney/client privilege. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), the
Supreme Court noted that "[tihe attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law. . . . Its purpose is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients .... " Nowhere in the
opinion did Justice Rehnquist elevate the issues discussed to a constitutional level. Since
there is little authority to support the constitutional right to effective counsel before federal
agencies, Congress is the proper entity to eliminate agency interference with the attorney/client privilege.
35. Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at ii-iii; see also Keating, Muething & Klekamp,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 82,124 at 81,993-94 (Karmel, Comm'r,
dissenting) (Because of "the potential corruption of justice when an administrative agency
with significant prosecutorial responsibilities has the power to sanction an adversary representing and advising a client[, the SEC] should not exercise disciplinary power against
attorneys [except] to keep its proceedings orderly and dignified.").
The Standing Committee clarified the effective counsel aspect of the argument. It
stated: "The administrative agency's claim of displinary power over the lawyer who represents the client with respect to the agency threatens the client with loss of access to the
independent counsel and vigorous representation which is most needed when a citizen is
confronted by the power of government." 1980 ABA Standing Committee Report, supra
note 22, at 3.
36. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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regulation of attorneys but concerned a state examining board
empowered to supervise and discipline physicians. Although the
Court unanimously sustained a combination of investigative and
adjudicative responsibilities, the decision's rationale is relevant to
the issues under consideration. The Court stated:
The contention that the combination of investigative and
adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional
risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a. . . difficult
burden of persuasion to carry....
That is not to say that there is nothing to the argument that
those who have investigated should not then adjudicate. The
issue is substantial, it is not new, and legislators and others concerned with the operations of administrative agencies have
given much attention to whether and to what extent distinctive
administrative functions should be performed by the same persons.. . . Within the Federal Government itself, Congress has
addressed the issue in several different ways, providing for varying degrees of separation from complete separation of functions to virtually none at all...
That the combination of investigative and adjudicative
functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining
from the special facts and circumstances present in the case
before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.3 7
The Franck Proposal3" seems to indicate that "special facts and
circumstances" may exist so as to make the "risk of unfairness
intolerably high" when an agency has substantive and disciplinary
jurisdiction. 9 The second part of the constitutional argument
flows from a perception that the combination of the substantive
and disciplinary functions has such great potential for abuse that
neither the attorney/client relationship nor vigorous and diligent
representation can remain unaffected. Although the question
whether the Supreme Court would find an improper commingling
37. Id. at 47, 51-52, 58.
38. See supra note 6.
39. Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at ii-iii. Chairman Franck expressed further
concern:

IT]here are fundamental constitutional deficiencies in attempts to vest disciplinary jurisdiction over practitioners in administrative agencies which also exercise
substantive jurisdiction over the clients those practitioners represent. In consequence, thereof, we believe that any agency discipline structure which permits
such a merger of disciplinary jurisdiction over the practitioner and substantive
jurisdiction over his client under any circumstances acquiesces in the potential for
serious harm to essential client interests and is unacceptable.
Letter from Michael Franck to Margery H. Waxman and Herbert E. Forrest 1 (Mar. 16,
1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter cited
as Franck Letter to Waxman & Forrest].
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of functions in a particular agency under the Withrow standards
might be interesting, the answer is subject to conjecture and, thus,
would not assist this discussion.
A more relevant inquiry to the separation of functions issue is
whether potential violations of constitutional rights are inherent

in any combination of substantive and disciplinary jurisdiction or
may result from the structure of particular agencies' disciplinary
systems.40 Congress has expressly delegated authority 4' to regulate
attorneys to the Patent and Trademark Office42 and to the Department of the Treasury. 43 Each of these agencies has well-established procedures for regulating attorneys and nonattorneys
practicing before them. 4 Of interest is that the attorneys practic-

ing before these agencies oppose the establishment of disciplinary
mechanisms separate from these agencies. 45 The ability of two
agencies to keep their substantive and disciplinary jurisdictions
separated, at least to the extent to elicit support from those affected, seems to indicate that the problems perceived by the
Franck Proposal are not inherent but structural. 46 If the problems
40. Myron C. Baum, a Washington, D.C., practitioner, placed in perspective the issues
raised by the Franck Proposal. Baum questioned the imposition of a uniform disciplinary
code on all federal agencies when only the SEC has attempted to regulate practitioners
aggressively. He concluded that a separation of functions becomes imperative when one
agency oversteps its bounds because such conduct paves the way for similar overreaching
by other agencies. Letter from Myron C. Baum to Marie L. Garibaldi 1-2 (Jan. 6, 1982)
(on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
41. For examples of implied authority, see 15 U.S.C § 78w(a)(1) (1982) (SEC), upheld
in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979); 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976)
(NLRB), upheld in Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952).
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32 (1976). Although the name "Patent Office" appears frequently
in judicial decisions and the United States Code, Congress changed the name to "Patent
and Trademark Office" in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-596, § 3, 88 Stat. 1949
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) (granting express authority to Secretary of Interior).
44. Eg., 37 C.F.R. § 1.341(a) (1983) (admission to Patent and Trademark Office); id.
§ 1.348 (suspension/disbarment; same); 31 C.F.R. § 8.1-.72 (practice before Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms); id. § 10.1-.75 (same; IRS).
45. The author has found little attorney criticism of the IRS's processing of attorney
discipline cases. For an indication of the Patent and Trademark Office's performance, see
Resolution 502-4 of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American Bar
Association, adopted by the section at the ABA's 1981 Annual Meeting (supporting continued authority in that office to regulate attorneys). SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT LAW, 1982 COMMITTEE REPORTS 261 (1982).

46. Chairman Franck questioned the validity of this conclusion, stating:
While we acknowledge. . . that lawyers who practice before the Department
of the Treasury and the United States Patent Office appear to be satisfied with the
manner in which those agencies are currently carrying out their responsibilities,
that seems to us to be no answer to the potential for abuse inherent in a merged

1983-84]

REGUL4TION OF ATTORNEYS

are structural, the concern should not be with the delegation of
combined authority but rather with the separation of authority

within a particular agency's structure.
B. Express Versus Implied Authoriy
A final argument regarding the authority of federal agencies to
regulate attorneys involves the distinction between express and

implied authority. 47 The basic hypothesis of this argument is that

structure. We believe that client interests require structural protection against potential abuses rather than mere reliance upon the good judgment of those who at
the moment administer the system.
Franck Letter to Waxman & Forrest, supra note 39, at I. Professor Robert Hamilton of the
University of Texas School of Law responded to this argument by stating that the Franck
Proposal "ignores the most basic conceptions about separations of functions within federal
agencies that permit the agency to perform simultaneously adjudicative and prosecutorial
functions without the latter infecting the former with bias or prejudice." Letter from Robert H. Hamilton to Herbert E. Forrest (May 12, 1980) (on file with the Case Western Reserve
Law Review and the ACUS).
Chairman Franck attempted to diminish the significance of the Patent and Trademark
Office's and the Treasury Department's successful separation of substantive and disciplinary functions by associating their current structure with current personnel. Franck Letter
to Waxman & Forrest, supra note 39, at 1. Chairman Franck overlooked the following
facts: (1) The Patent and Trademark Office has regulated persons practicing before it since
1861,see Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 8,12 Stat. 244, 247 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 32 (1976)); (2) The Treasury Department's authority originated in 1884, see Act of July 7,
1884, ch. 334, § 3, 23 Stat. 236, 258 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976)); and
(3) The Supreme Court extensively reviewed and upheld the authority of the Patent and
Trademark Office to regulate persons practicing before the office. Sperry v. Florida, 373
U.S. 379 (1963). Finally, the "contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a. . . difficult burden of persuasion to carry. . . . [A] court [must determine]
from the special facts and circumstances . . . that the risk of unfairness is intolerably
high." Withrow v Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 58 (1975) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes 36-37. Arguments based only on "potential for abuse" do not seem to
satisfy the Withrow standard for violation of due process, in light of Patent and Treasury
experiences and the absence of specific facts demonstrating abuse in the regulation of attorneys throughout the federal administrative process.
47. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. An early draft of the Waxman/Forrest Proposal presented another aspect of the issue whether agencies should have
authority to discipline persons practicing before them:
[In the case of at least two federal agencies, the Internal Revenue Service and the
Patent Office, the Congress has specifically addressed itself to the requirements of
practice, and has authorized those agencies to promulgate and enforce specialized
standards of conduct and to discipline attorneys. ...
The rationale for a separate set of discipline rules for these agencies is particularly strong because the Congressional grant of authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury to suspend or disbar practitioners before the IRS covers CPA's and enrolled agents (anyone admitted to practice before the IRS who is not an attorney
or CPA) as well as attorneys, providing consistency of treatment for all practitioners, and Patent Office practice also includes practitioners who are not attorneys.
ABA Sections of Admin. Law, Natural Resources Law, & Pub. Util. Law, & Fed. Communications Bar Ass'n, Report to the House of Delegates 10-11 & n.* (draft Mar. 5, 1982) (on
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the power to regulate attorneys practicing before federal agencies
must be express and not implied.4 8
In Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals,49 the
Supreme Court found that Congress did not grant express authority to the Board, a federal agency. Nevertheless, the Justices implied "authority to prescribe . . rules of practice for the
admission of attorneys."5 0 Goldsmith seems to be dispositive of
the argument-the authority may be implied at least for the admission of attorneys. In 1965, however, Congress enacted the
Agency Practice Act,5" which eliminated
the authority of agencies
5 2
to set admission requirements.
The argument that the Agency Practice Act eliminated the
agencies' implied authority is based on the notion that an agency
must have the power of admission to have the power to discipline.
By denying agencies the power to refuse to allow attorneys to
practice before them, Congress has thus implicitly denied them
the power to discipline attorneys.53 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit expressly rejected this argument in Touche Ross &
Co. v. SEC, on the basis of statutory interpretation and legislative
history. 4 In addition, the argument analogizes to the judicial
file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS). Chairman Franck criticized this view:
Parenthetically, the rationale you advance for granting two specific agencies
exemptions from the prohibition against the merger of disciplinary and substantive jurisdiction in the same agency threatens to swallow the general rule. There
are after all many agencies in addition to those two before whom both lawyers
and non-lawyers practice, including agencies who in our judgment have exercised
the merged jurisdiction they claim they possess in a manner reflecting seriously
inadequate sensitivity to the client interests at stake.
Franck Letter to Waxman & Forrest, supra note 39, at 1-2.
48. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 578 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979); Letter
from Thomas Lumbard to William Warfield Ross 4 (Jan. 11, 1979) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter cited as Lumbard Letter to
Ross].
49. 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (denying writ of mandamus to compel Board of Tax Appeals to
enroll CPA as attorney with right to practice before it).
50. Id. at 122; see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
51. Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-332, 79 Stat. 1281 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 500 (1982)). For a detailed discussion of the Act, see infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b), (e). The Act exempts the Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
§ 500(e). It also contains an ambiguous provision: "This section does not ... authorize or
limit the discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appear in a representative
capacity before an agency. Id. § 500(d)(2).
53. Lumbard Letter to Ross, supra note 48, at 4.
54. 609 F.2d 570, 578 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979). The court stated:
Appellants contend that the enactment in 1965 of 5 U.S.C. § 500, eliminating
federal agency practice admission requirements, demonstrates the intent of Con-

1983-84]

REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS

power to regulate attorneys; however, that may not be the power
present in this situation. If Congress has authority to regulate attorneys practicing before federal agencies, the issue is delegation
and not separation of powers. The appropriate inquiry would
then become whether Congress may delegate all or a portion of
the function and whether it used the appropriate standards in the
delegation.5"
In Sperry v. Floridaex rel. FloridaBar,5 6 the Court sustained
the authority of the Patent and Trademark Office to regulate the
persons practicing before it by stating: "Finally, § 31 [regulations
for agents and attorneys] contains sufficient standards to guide the
Patent Office in its admissions policy to avoid the criticism that
Congress has improperly delegated its powers to the administrative agency." 57 The Court seemed to indicate that the authority to
set admission requirements, the first aspect of regulating the practice of law, is a power which remains with Congress unless effectively delegated. When Congress withdrew the power to set
admission requirements from federal agencies except the Patent
gress to strip the SEC of any authority to discipline professionals practicing
before it. The stated purpose of the section was quite to the contrary. It was
intended to ensure that persons appearing before the agencies be representedby
attorneys of their choice. . . . Moreover, the statute explicitly provides in
§ 500(d)(2) that the section "does not. . . authorize or limit the discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appear in a representative capacity before an
agency ...
" (emphasis added). . . . The language, as appellants acknowledge,
is "neutral". It neither authorizes nor limits the power of the agencies to discipline professionals who appear or practice before them ....
Id. (citations omitted).
55. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
56. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
57. Id. at 403, 404 (emphasis added). Article I, § 8 of the Constitution buttresses the
authority of Congress to regulate persons practicing before the Patent and Trademark Office: "The Congress shall have Power. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries .... " U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In addition, the
Sperry Court discussed extensively the relationship between Congress and the Patent and
Trademark Office. Despite these two points, the Court's statement should not be discounted as precedent for Congress' general authority to regulate persons practicing before
administrative agencies.
The Supreme Court pursued this point in Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926), where it sustained the Board's implied power to prescribe rules
for the admission of accountants to practice before it. In dictum, the Court acknowledged
the authority of Congress to delegate the power to regulate attorneys to an agency. Id. at
122. The Court did not, however, refer to the express constitutional delegation of power to
Congress "to lay and collect Taxes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Sperry and Goldsmith both involved agencies which have powers under express constitutional delegations to Congress. Despite this fact, one can argue that this distinction has
no significance because all congressional delegations to agencies must be constitutionally
authorized, expressly or impliedly, or they are impermissible.
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and Trademark Office, the authority to promulgate standards and
to discipline remained in the agencies to the extent previously delegated. As a consequence, the Agency Practice Act arguably did
not affect the ability of federal agencies to base their authority to
regulate attorneys, except for admission requirements, on an implied delegation from Congress.
II.

ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEYS PRACTICING
BEFORE FEDERAL AGENCIES

A. Requirements of the Agency PracticeAct
The Agency Practice Act58 allows an individual to choose any
attorney in good standing to represent him in federal agency matters,59 that is, the attorney must be a member in good standing of
a state bar. The attorney must also file a written declaration that
he is qualified and authorized to represent the individual. 60 The
Act has four limitations. It does not (1) authorize or limit the discipline of persons acting in a representative capacity before an
agency, (2) authorize representation by a former employee prohibited by statute or regulation, (3) prevent an agency from requiring
a power of attorney as a condition to a monetary settlement, or (4)
apply to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office. 6 '
The Act contains the limitations on former employees to permit agencies to deal with the so-called "revolving door" practice
of federal government employees. 62 Some agencies have promul58. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1982).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4171. Prior to the Act a number of agencies had admission requirements restricting the right to practice before them. See F. VoM BAUR, STANDARDS OF ADMISSION
FOR PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1953); Henley,Admission of
Attorneys to Practice Before FederalAdministrative Agencies, 24 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 1198-206
(1957). In 1957, the Justice Department recommended that agencies abolish admission requirements and most agencies did by 1965. When Congress considered enacting the
Agency Practice Act, only the Department of the Treasury and the Patent Office raised
objections to eliminating their admission to practice requirements. See H.R. REP. No.
1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4171.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1982).
61. Id. § 500(d)(l)-(4), (e).
62. [Mlany government attorneys ..
choose not to make government service a
career and enter or return to private practice. This flow of attorneys benefits the
government by bringing seasoned lawyers and enthusiastic law school graduates
into public service, and gives attorneys an opportunity to acquire expertise and
skills that can benefit their subsequent private practice.
Note, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1026
(1977).
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gated their own rules restricting postemployment activities.6 3 In
addition, Congress has entered the field with specific guidelines.
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 amended existing postemployment legislation and imposed additional proscriptions.6 4
Statutes and regulations restricting postemployrnent activities attempt to eliminate possible unfair influence with the former
agency, deter improper use of confidential information, and discourage an employee from tailoring his official conduct in office to
enhance future employability in the private sector.6 5
The limitation requiring a power of attorney as a condition to
monetary settlement has not been controversial. This restriction,
however, may not be broad enough to address a situation encounby stattered by many agencies-release of information restricted
67
ute.66 A recent district court case, McDaniel v. Israel, is relevant
to the release of information problem. The court struck down a
Social Security Administration (SSA) regulation as inconsistent
with the Agency Practice Act. 6 8 The SSA rule required submission of a notice, signed by the client, stating that the attorney represented the client in dealings with the SSA. 6 9 The court held
improper the SSA's refusal to send the attorney notices and written communications until he submitted the signed appointment of
representation. 70 Although the court recognized the protection of
confidential, personal information as a concern, it held that "the
public is already adequately protected . . . by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1007. . . .Congress has established the procedure by which an
attorney may qualify to-represent a claimant [and] this is all that is
necessary and appropriate.'
Federal agencies may be caught in a statutory conflict when
dealing with information releases. Particular statutes require that
63. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 735 (1983) (Office of Personnel Management); 16 C.F.R.
§ 1025.67 (1983) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); 20 C.F.R. § 501.11(b) (1983)
(Department of Labor); 42 C.F.R. 5357 (1983) (Postal Service); 46 C.F.R. § 502.32 (1983)
(Federal Maritime Commission).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
65. See Shapiro, The Post-Employment Restrictions of the Ohio Ethics Law: Prior
Practiceand RecentAmendments, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 913, 917-23 (1980); infra note 163.
The ACUS recently adopted a recommendation relating to postemployment restrictions.
Recommendation No. 79-7, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-7 (1983).
66. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
67. 534 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. Va. 1982).
68. Id. at 370.
69. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1707 (1983).
70. 534 F. Supp. at 370.
71. Id.
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authorization be obtained before the agency releases restricted in-

formation.72 Sanctions may be imposed, in fact, on all officers
and employees of the United States for improper release.73 On
the other hand, McDaniel can be read as permitting an agency to
provide restricted information about the client to the attorney
without a further release from the client. The McDaniel opinion

does not, however, prohibit an agency from requiring a power of
attorney from a client prior to releasing restricted information.

The court only held that an agency may not make this power of
attorney a requirement of admission to practice before an agency.

An agency can presumably require a qualified 74 attorney to submit a power of attorney signed by the client prior to releasing information restricted by statute. This procedure would involve two
steps, rather than the one-step process invalidated in McDaniel.
Even if the court correctly interpreted the statute, this two-step
process is an unnecessary bureaucratic burden. Congress should
therefore amend the Agency Practice Act to permit an agency to
require a power of attorney from the client authorizing release of
information restricted by statute as a condition precedent to recognizing an attorney's representation.75
B. Requirements Beyond the Agency PracticeAct
In the Federal Questionnaire, 76 over ninety-five percent of the
responding agencies did not favor admission requirements beyond
those required by the Agency Practice Act.7 7 The Postal Service
72. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1982) (IRS); 35 U.S.C. §§ 122, 181 (1976) (Patent
and Trademark Office); 38 U.S.C. § 3305 (Supp. V 1981) (Veterans Administration).
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7213(a)(1), 7217 (1982); 35 U.S.C.
§ 186 (1976) (patent information); 38 U.S.C. § 3301(j) (Supp. V 1981) (incorporating penalty provisions of Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1982).
75. Section 500(d) should be amended to read: "This section does not. . . prevent an
agency from requiring a power of attorney as a condition to the release of information the
disclosure of which is restricted by law." See Weckstein, Control of Practice and Discipline
of Representatives before Federal Administrative Agencies-A Study and Recommendations for the Administrative Conference of the United States 34-42 (draft Oct. 1970) (on file
with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) (presenting similar recommendation and discussing powers of appointment as required by agencies in 1970); see also
H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 4171 (legislative history of § 500(d)(4)).
76. See supra note 13; infra appendix A.
77. Id. Twenty-seven agencies responded to the Federal Questionnaire. In some instances the author received responses from both the general counsel and chief administrative law judge of the agency, whereas in other instances only one official responded. The
following agencies responded: Department of State, Postal Rate Commission, Department
of Interior, United States International Trade Commission, Department of Commerce, Na-
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did indicate, however, that it currently imposes an additional admission requirement. Its rules provide that any attorney in good
standing who is not restricted under any court or executive order
may represent others before the Postal Service and that any person disbarred from practice before the Postal Service or any other
executive department is ineligible for admission to practice.7 8
These rules raise two issues. First, has the Postal Service im-

posed an additional admission requirement by denying eligibility
to practice to an attorney who is under a disciplinary order? The

Agency Practice Act does not appear to permit denial of eligibility
to practice due to discipline imposed by another agency. The Postal Service proscription thus seems to violate the Act.7 9 Postal
Service regulation 951 also appears to conflict with the Agency
tional Labor Relations Board, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Federal Reserve System, Department of Transportation, Federal Maritime Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Merit Systems
Protection Board, Department of Agriculture, Federal Communications Commission, Department of the Treasury, Department of Health and Human Services, United States Coast
Guard, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Trade Commission, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Food and Drug Administration, United States Postal Service, National Transportation
Safety Board, and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Of these, only 24
responded to the question on admission requirements. Two stated parenthetically that the
imposition of additional requirements would relate to competence. See infra appendix A,
questions I & 2; supra note 13.
78. 39 C.F.R. § 951.2(c), .3(a)-(b) (1983).
79. In addition, at least two parts of SEC rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1983), arguably violate the Agency Practice Act as "indirect" admission requirements. The rule permits
the SEC to discipline an attorney who does not "possess the requisite qualifications to
represent others" or is "lacking in character or integrity." Id. § 201.2(e)(1)(i)-(ii); see infra
note 101 for the text of rule 2(e).
The issue is whether these standards permit the SEC to define competence and moral
qualifications and to restrict eligibility to practice before it. If the response is affirmative,
defining these concepts independently rather than relying on the professional standards of
the licensing state seems to violate the Agency Practice Act. The Act provides that federal
agencies base admission to practice on the individual's admission to a state bar. 5 U.S.C.
§ 500(b)(1982). The legislative history of the Agency Practice Act reveals that Congress
intended to eliminate specialized bars before federal agencies and to have states determine
competence and moral character, except for the Patent and Trademark Office. See H.R.
REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4170-80; S. REP. No. 755, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-7 (1965). If an agency can discipline a
person because he lacks character or integrity, is not the agency indirectly saying that he
must meet its competence and moral standards or the agency will remove his eligibility to
practice by a disciplinary proceeding? Rule 2(e)(1)(ii)'s alternative basis for discipline-that the attorney has "engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct"reinforces the reasonableness of this interpretation of rule 2(e). 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(l)(ii)
(1983). For a discussion of whether the Agency Practice Act authorizes federal agencies to
adopt standards relating to unethical or improper conduct, see infra notes 100-74 and accompanying text.
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Practice Act's provision that an attorney must only be "a member
in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a State
...

.

"80

The Act seems to say that if a person is a member of

two state bars and one state has disbarred him, that person remains qualified to practice before a federal agency. 8 ' In contrast,
the regulation permits the Postal Service to disqualify a person

from practicing before it when one state has disciplined him but
82

he remains a member in good standing of another state bar.
Congress apparently overlooked this anomaly when it enacted the
Agency Practice Act. Congress should therefore amend the Act to

eliminate this possibility. 3
Second, may an agency ipso facto deny eligibility to practice
on the basis of the licensing state's or an executive agency's disciplinary order without an independent determination of the alleged disqualifying conduct by the agency? Postal Service
regulation 951 also raises this issue. With regard to discipline imposed by another agency, the answer seems clear. Under the
Agency Practice Act, one agency may not deny eligibility to practice because of disciplinary action taken by or misconduct before
another agency. 84 The Act provides for a single admission re80. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1982). For a discussion of the effect given by a federal agency
to a disciplinary action of a licensing state, see Letters between Michael Franck and Howard C. Anderson (May 17, 19, 28 & June 2, 4, 7, 1982) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter cited as Anderson Letters].
81. See Anderson Letter (May 19, 1982), supra note 80, at 2; Anderson Letter (May
28, 1982), supra note 80, at 2.
82. 39 C.F.R. § 951.2(c) (1983).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) should be amended to read:
An individual who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest
court of a State may represent a person before an agency on filing with the agency
a written declaration that he is currently qualified as provided by this subsection
and is authorized to represent the particular person in whose behalf he acts.
Notwithstanding, an agency which receives notice that a State license, by virtue of
which an individual is (or could have been) qualified under this subsection to
represent persons before the agency, has been suspended, enjoined, restrained,
revoked, or otherwise restricted by the State, may require the individual to show
cause within forty days why he should not be similarly suspended, enjoined, restrained, disbarred, or otherwise restricted in representing persons before the
agency. The agency may suspend temporarily the right of the individual to represent persons before the agency unless and until he shall show cause.
The author employs the indefinite article "a," rather than the definite article "the," to modify "state license" so that if a person is licensed in more than one state, an agency may
require him to "show cause" even though his right to practice has not been affected in all
licensing states. For a similar recommendation, see T. Lumbard, Proposed Amendments to
Title 5, United States Code, Section 500, at 4-5, attachedto Letter from Thomas Lumbard
to Jeffrey S. Lubbers (Mar. 25, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review
and the ACUS); see also infra note 94 (suggesting another amendment to § 500(b)).
84. Although the Agency Practice Act does not "authorize or limit the discipline, in-
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quirement-current good standing to practice before the highest
court of a state.8 5
With regard to discipline by a licensing authority, three federal
court cases are instructive.8 6 In Selling v. Radford, the Supreme
Court held that effect may be given to an attorney's disbarment by
the highest court of a state when considering that attorney's right
to practice before the United States Supreme Court.8 7 The Court
explained, however, that it would not give effect to a state court's
disbarment proceeding which violated due process requirements,
contained an infirmity as to proof of facts, or demonstrated a
grave reason why it should be disregarded. 88 In Theard v. United
States,8 9 the Court amplified its holding in Selling, stating:
Disbarment being the very serious business that it is, ample opportunity must be afforded to show cause why an accused practitioner should not be disbarred. If the accusation rests on
disbarment by a state court, such determination of course
But it is not conclusively
brings title deeds of high respect.
0
binding on the federal courts.
In 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended
the rationale of Theard and Selling to administrative agencies
considering the effect to be given disciplinary action taken by an
attorney's licensing state. 9 t Five years later, the Attorney General
of the United States restated the Court of Appeals' requirement of
"an independent judgment in suspension proceedings" by reversing the rehearing of the case. 92 The Attorney General recommended that Congress amend the Agency Practice Act "to provide
for a 'show-cause' hearing before an agency restricts the right to
93
practice because of discipline imposed by the licensing state."
This recommendation should be implemented as soon as
possible.94
cluding disbarment, of individuals who appear in a representative capacity before an
agency," nothing indicates that Congress intended this provision to apply to misconduct
before another agency. 5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2) (1982).

85. Id. § 500(b).
86. For a discussion of two of these cases, see Anderson Letter (May 28, 1982), supra
note 80, at 2; Anderson Letter (June 2, 1982), supra note 80, at 2; Anderson Letter (June 4,
1982), supra note 80, at 2-3.
87. 243 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1917).
88. Id. at 51.
89. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
90. Id. at 282.
91. Bogart v. Carter, 445 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1971).
92. In re Bogart, 38 Ad. L. Rep. 2d (P & F) 124 (1976).
93. Id. at 129.
94. If Congress amends the Agency Practice Act to permit reciprocity for discipline
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C. A CentralizedAdmissions Register
An early draft of the Franck Proposal suggested the creation
of a centralized register of attorneys because
[a]n efficient system requires the development and
maintainence [sic] of a roster of the name, address, and
birthdate of all practitioners, the agencies before which they are
admitted to practice, and the jurisdictions in which they are licensed, in order to assist . . . in the proper identification of
practitioners who allegedly have engaged in professional
misconduct. 95
Opposition to the register apparently induced the ABA Standing
Committee to delete the concept from subsequent drafts and the
final proposed rules presented to the House of Delegates. 96 Critics
viewed the register as "burdensome," 97 "creating great repositories of files,"9 and inherently incomplete because of the impossibility of constructing a comprehensive listing. 99 The expense and
problems involved in producing a complete listing make the creation of a centralized listing of attorneys practicing in the federal
administrative process highly unlikely.
imposed by states, federal courts, and other federal agencies, the suggested amendment to 5
U.S.C. § 500(b), supra note 83, should be changed to read:
Notwithstanding, an agency which receives notice that a State license, by virtue of
which an individual is (or could have been) qualified under this subsection to
represent persons before the agency, or that such an individual's qualification to
represent persons before a federal court or before another agency has been suspended, enjoined, restrained, revoked, or otherwise restricted by the State, federal
court, or other agency may require the individual to show cause within forty days
why he should not be similarly suspended, enjoined, restrained, disbarred, or
otherwise restricted in representing persons before the agency. The agency may
suspend temporarily the right of the individual to represent persons before the
agency unless and until he shall show cause.
For further discussion of reciprocity of agency discipline, see infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
95. ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Draft Model Mechanism 9
(Mar. 19, 1981) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
96. Franck Proposal, supra note 6.
97. Letter from Michael R. Klein to William T. Warner 3 (Apr. 15, 1981) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) [hereinafter referred to as Klein
Letter].
98. Letter from Herbert E. Forrest to William T. Warner 8 (Apr. 8, 1981) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
99. The listing would be incomplete because some "agencies do not enroll a practitioner but instead provide that an attorney qualified to practice in any state ... is automatically authorized to practice before that agency," Letter from Fred Grabowsky to
Marcia L. Proctor 2 (Apr. 9, 1981) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and
the ACUS), and a "lawyer in the hinterlands who never physically appears in agency
premises, in person or by paper, but who advises a client about a statute or rule administered by an agency" will not be included. Klein Letter, supra note 97, at 3.
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STANDARDS FOR AGENCY REGULATION OF ATTORNEY
CONDUCT

A. Agencies' Attempts at EstablishingStandards
On February 28, 1981, the SEC announced in In re Carter,"°
an interpretation of SEC practice rule 2(e).' 0 In essence, the SEC
held that an attorney violates professional standards if he fails to
take prompt steps to end his corporate client's noncompliance
02
with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.'
The SEC explained that an attorney should first counsel accurate
disclosure. If the client, however, does not follow this advice and
continues to violate the securities laws, the attorney must take
"further, more affirmative steps."' 1

3

For example, the attorney

should resign, approach the board of directors directly, or seek aid
from other members of management "to correct the underlying
problem, rather than. . . capitulat[e] to the desires of a strong-

willed, but misguided client."'"
Six months later, the Commissioners requested comments on
the appropriateness of the announced interpretation. 0 5 The request specifically stated, however, that comments on the SEC's
100. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1983). The rule provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or
integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii)
to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the federal securities laws ... or the rules and regulations thereunder.
See supra note 79.
102. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172. The promulgation of new policy without applying that policy in the instant adjudication would appear
to be a "prospective order" similar in nature to the "Excelsior Rule" invalidated in NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). Cf. McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1042
n.17 (5th Cir. 1981).
103. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172.
104. Id.
105. Request for Comments on Standard of Conduct Constituting Unethical or Improper Professional Practice Before the Commission, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 183,026 (Sept. 21, 1981). The SEC's request for comments did not cure the
prospective order aspect of the interpretation, see supra note 102, since the interpretation
remained in effect subject to change:
After careful consideration of these comments, the Commission will issue a further release summarizing and analyzing the comments received. Based upon the
comments, it may ormay not determine to expand or modify its interpretation. Until
that time, the present interpretationwill govern all similar circumstances for purposes of proceedings pursuant to Rule 2(e) if the conduct occurred after February
28, 1981.
Id. at 84,532 (emphasis added).
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"authority to adopt and administer rule 2(e)" were not being solicited. °6 The attempt to limit public input to the Carter interpretation of rule 2(e) was unsuccessful. Many comments directly
challenged the Commission's authority to establish any standards
similar to canons of ethics or a code of professional responsibility.lOT The Commissioners' request for comments on the Carter
standard prompted concern among associations of attorneys and
individual practitioners about an emerging type of practice standard. This standard effectively would compel attorneys to assist

in carrying out an agency's substantive law responsibilities. In
1973, the SEC had clearly stated its intention to enlist attorneys,
and it reaffirmed that purpose in Carter:
We have previously noted "the pecularly [sic] strategic and especially central place of the private practicing lawyer in the investment process and in the enforcement of the body of federal
law aimed at keeping that process fair. . . .[T]he task of enrests in overwhelming measure on
forcing the securities 0 laws
8
the bar's shoulders."'
In addition to the SEC, the IRS proposed a similar role for
106. Id.
107. See Comments to SEC Zero in on Agency Authority, 68 A.B.A. J. 252 (1982), for a
brief summary of a number of comments. All comments received are available for public
inspection at the SEC under file no. 57-905.
The ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law's response is representative of the comments received:
The Proposal appears to reflect the Commission's belief that, notwithstanding
the absence of any authority for the Commission to establish a "federal securities
bar," the Commission somehow possesses and should exercise authority, analogous to that possessed by state bar authorities and state courts, to promulgate the
equivalent of canons of ethics or a code of professional responsibility. The current proposal is, of course, concerned with but one aspect of the relationship between lawyers and their corporate securities clients. We find nothing in the
Release, however, that acknowledges any limitation on the Commission's belief
concerning its power to set standards of conduct for lawyers acting as lawyers. . . .In our view the Proposal to transform the Commission into a promulgator of ethical norms for the legal profession is a novel and disturbing one.
ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Business Law, Response to Securities Act Release No.
6344, Exchange Act Release No. 18106, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No.
22200, Trust Indenture Release No. 656, Investment Company Act Release No. 11942,
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 775, at 2-3 (Sept. 21, 1981) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) (subsequently adopted by ABA Board of
Governors as ABA policy).
108. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 82,847, at 84,150 n.21 (quoting
In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973), ajt'd without opinion, 495 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir.
1974)). The SEC in Fieldr made its intent even clearer:
[Tihis Commission with its small staff, limited resources, and onerous tasks is
peculiarly dependent on the probity and the diligence of the professionals who
practice before it. This is a field where unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm. . . . Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor.
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attorneys. In 1980 it proposed new rules which would have prohibited an attorney from issuing a tax shelter opinion unless he
concluded that it was "more likely than not that the bulk of the
tax benefits on the basis of which the tax shelter had been promoted are allowable under the tax law."' °9 A breach of this standard would have constituted grounds for disbarment before the
IRS without regard to the willfulness of the violation." 0 Other
federal agencies followed the SEC and IRS initiatives to promulgate standards of conduct for attorneys practicing before them."'

This increased federal agency interest lead in large part to the
ABA House of Delegates' attorney conduct proposals in August

1982.112
B. Agencies' Authority to Establish Standards

Analysis of the authority of federal agencies to promulgate
standards of conduct is central to understanding regulation of atId. at 266 n.20. But cf. In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 82,124 at 81,992 (July 11, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting):
In my opinion, Rule 2(e) is an invalid exercise of the Commission's authority. I
recognize that I am not writing on a clean slate, but until the question of the
Commission's authority to discipline attorneys is validated by the United States
Supreme Court or the Congress, I believe the validity of Rule 2(e) will not be free
from doubt. I also recognize that the Commission has brought numerous 2(e)
proceedings against attorneys, and that unless the courts or Congress abrogate the
rule, the Commission, unfortunately, is unlikely to rescind it.
Accordingly, I advocate that the Commission at least confine proceedings against attorneys under
Rule 2(e) to cases in which an attorney has improperly conducted himself while
personally representing clients before the Commission. Further, the misconduct
should thwart the Commission's ability to function or should obstruct administrative justice. In no case, I believe, should the Commission invoke an equivocal
administrative remedy like Rule 2(e) to discipline attorneys for conduct which
does not directly threaten its administrative processes. To do so, is tantamount to
setting professional standards for the practice of law.
Id. at 81,745. For a discussion of the SEC position on enlisting attorneys, see Pickholtz,
The ProposedModel Rules of ProfessionalConduct-andOther Assaults Upon theAttorneyClient Relationship, 36 Bus. LAW. 1841, 1848-51 (1981).
109. Amendments to Circular 230, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594 (1980).
110. Id. at 58,597-98. For an explanation of the proposed tax shelter rule, see Hester,
Are New TreasuryRules a Tax Device in Disguise?, Legal Times (Wash.), Sept. 29, 1980, at
12, col. 1. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
346 (1982), reprintedin ProfessionalEthics Opinions, 68 A.B.A. J. 471, 471 n.2 (1982) (providing citations to other authorities discussing this issue).
One commentor observed: "Just as the debate over the SEC's Rule 2(e) program begins
to boil and bubble [the IRS] is suggesting improper conduct in tax counseling could be
grounds for discipline by the Treasury Department." Lempert, IRS MullsAttorney Shelter
Crackdown, Legal Times (Wash.), Dec. 3, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
111. See, e.g., NRC Will Discpline Lawyers Under ProposedConduct Rules, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 11,1980, at 8, col. 1;Moore, FERC Criticizes Lawyers' Work, Legal Times (Wash.),
Jan. 4, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
112. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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torneys by federal agencies. Even if one concludes that an agency
has authority to promulgate such standards, one must then consider the extent to which the power may be exercised.' 1 3 Without
question, Congress has granted explicit authority to adopt practice
standards and to discipline attorneys who violate the standards to
the Patent and Trademark Office: "The Commissioner. .. may
prescribe regulations governing the . . . conduct of attorneys
[and] may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or
exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further
practice before the Patent and Trademark Office any. . attorney
. . who does not comply with the regulations. ' 14 The Treasury
Department has similar authority:
The Secretary of Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of... attorneys [and] may after due

notice and opportunity for hearing suspend, and disbar from
further practice before his department any such

. . .

attorney

shown to be incompetent, disreputable, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations." 5
Except for the few agencies with express authority to promulgate rules and discipline attorneys for violations," 6 this authority
must be implied. In Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,"7 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit approved the SEC's implied authority under rule 2(e) to discipline professionals-accountants in
the instant case-practicing before it. The court held that although the SEC has "no express statutory provision authorizing
the Commission to discipline professionals appearing before it,"
rule 2(e) is a valid exercise of the agency's rulemaking authority,"11 8 since it "protects[s] the integrity of its own processes [and]
113. A proposed addition to the Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7, attempted
"to preclude any implication that the ABA ... endorses the efficacy of express statutory
authorizations of federal agencies to adopt standards of practice [and to make clear that]
the exceptions for such express statutory authority [in the original proposal were] not intended to express any conclusion. . . on those important issues." Letter from W. Loeber
Landau to Antonin Scalia 1-2 (July 16, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review and the ACUS). This resolution may have been prompted by a concern that the
original Waxman/Forrest Proposal would permit the SEC simply to seek express authority
from Congress to adopt standards. See Letter from Stuart N. Senniger to Joseph A.
DeGrandi 3-4 (July 19, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the
ACUS).
114. 35 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32 (1976).
115. 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976).
116. For another example of express authority, see 43 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) (empowering Secretary of the Interior to promulgate rules to regulate attorneys, with language similar to that empowering Secretary of the Treasury). See supra text accompanying note 115.
117. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
118. Section 23(a)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(l)
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ensure[s] that those professionals on whom the Commission relies
• . . perform their tasks diligently and with a reasonable degree of
competence." ' t 9 Although Touche Ross only sustained rule 2(e)
as applied to accountants, strong dictum suggests that the court's
rationale applies equally to the SEC's authority to discipline attorneys under rule 2(e). 120
The court's basis for sustaining the implied authority of agencies to regulate the conduct of persons practicing before them is
open to criticism. The breadth of the power to "protect the integrity of. . . administrative procedures and the public" is left unclear. Dissenting in Keating, Muething & Klekamp,' 2 ' SEC
Commissioner Karmel criticized Touche Ross:
[The Court's] rationale may justify the use of Rule 2(e) to discipline accountants, although express statutory authority to this
effect would, in my mind, be better government. However I do
not believe this rationale is sufficient to justify the use of Rule
2(e), as presently drafted, as a general enforcement tool to discipline attorneys

. .

. In my opinion, it is improper for an in-

dependent federal administrative agency to impose sanctions
which are not specied by Congress. In addition, the potential
corruption of justice when an administrative agency with significant prosecutorial responsibilities has the power to sanction
an adversary representing and advising a client persuades me
that the Commission should not exercise disciplinary power
against attorneys. The Commission, like any other government
body, may have some need to have and to utilize a disciplinary
power againstattorneys who practicebefore it in order to keep its
proceedings orderiy and dignfiFed. However, the lack of any
demonstrated need for an enforcement mechanism generally to
raise the competence of attorneys or to protect investors is indicated by the history of Rule 2(e) ....
(1982), authorizes the SEC "to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of this title for which [it is] responsible ....
119. 609 F.2d at 582; see ln re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847 at 84,147.
120. 609 F.2d 577-78. But see infra note 122.
121. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,992. See supra
note 108.
122. Id. at 81,993. Commissioner Karmel noted the express statutory differences between the SEC's authority to discipline attorneys and its authority over accountants:
Congress gave the [SEC] express statutory power in Section 19(a) and Schedule A
of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . to define accounting terms and to require that
financial statements be certified by an independent public accountant. It therefore can be argued that the administrative disciplining of accountants is a necessary and appropriate adjunct to an express Commission mandate and
responsibility. In the case of attorneys, however, there is no such direct substantive authority for the Commission to implement by way of an administrative
remedy.

200
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Although other judicial decisons have sustained implied authority of agencies to regulate attorneys,' 2 3 Touche Ross is the
most recent precedent. Commissioner Karmel has correctly
pointed out that Touche Ross is dictum with respect to attorneys
and the SEC's statutory authority to regulate accountants differs
from its authority to regulate attorneys. 2 4 Although the Touche
Ross language seems clear, dictum is not precedent. Commissioner Karmel also questioned the extent to which an agency with
authority to promulgate standards may address attorney conduct

beyond that required to keep its proceedings orderly and dignified. She appeared to suggest making a distinction between stan-

dards which maintain order in or assure the integrity of a
particular proceeding and those which enhance attorney compe-

tence or enlist attorneys to assist in enforcing substantive law.
This distinction is arguably valid.
Something appears to be amiss when substantive law provisions such as disclosure in the securities area or tax shelter enforcement must be enforced by ethical standards. An attorney
who violates a requirement imposed by statute should be called to
task in the courts for the substantive violation.' 2 5 A theoretical
1d. (referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 77aa (1982)). Commissioner Karmel apparently opposed even express statutory authority, as indicated by her strong disapproval of congressional legislation then pending:
[Tihere is presently pending in Congress legislation [S. 262] which contains a provision which could be construed to vest not only the Commission but any federal
agency with effectively unlimited power to discipline attorneys. [S. 262 provides
that] "each agency may prohibit any individual from appearing before the agency
or its responsible employees whenever such individual refuses to adhere to reasonable standards of orderly and ethical conduct or continues, despite agency
requests to the contrary, to engage in the deliberate use of dilatory tactics ....
Although enactment of this provision would solve the problems I have with the
Commission's statutory authority to promulgate Rule 2(e), I believe such a provision would be contrary to sound public policy ....
Id. at 81,993 n.8 (quoting § 203(a) of S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 1408,
1415 (1979) (emphasis added)). See Karmel, Attorneys' SecuritiesLaw Liabilities, 27 Bus.
LAW. 1153 (1972); Daley & Karmel,,Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversariesat the Bar ofthe
SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975).
123. See cases cited supra note 41.
124. See supra note 122.
125. The SEC, in addition to responding to attorney misconduct by rule 2(e) proceedings, also seeks injunctions against attorney violations of the securities laws. See, e.g., SEC
v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 538 F.2d 404 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977). The SEC can also criminally prosecute attorneys for securities laws violations. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d
Cir. 1964). Sometimes these alternatives come together in one case. See, e.g., In re Fields,
45 S.E.C. 262 (1973) (permanently disqualifying under rule 2(e) an attorney who had been
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basis for objecting to the use of professional standards to compensate for deficiencies in substantive law, or for the inconvenience,
expense, or delay of pursuing substantive violations in the judicial
or administrative process, is difficult to formulate. Dean John F.
Sutton, Jr., however, provided an insight for analysis in his discussion of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 6 Dean
Sutton first explained the Code's division into canons, which he

defined as "general concepts used as chapter headings," ethical
considerations, defined as "aspirational in character," and disciplinary rules, defined as "mandatory regulatory rules."' 127 He
then noted that canons and ethical considerations were not intended to be binding or enforced as regulatory rules or law, although this occasionally has occurred.' 28 In addition, Dean
Sutton observed that disciplinary rules have been misused in subconduct-an
stantive cases as rules of procedure to affect lawyer
29
ill-suited role for the rules in some instances.'
One can infer from Dean Sutton's remarks that guidelines to
enjoined four times from violating various sections of securities laws). On occasion, action
taken by the SEC in a rule 2(e) proceeding is reversed. See, e.g., Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d
956 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Lastly, an attorney may be subject to a damage action by persons
injured by his misconduct. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., N.A. v. National
Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); cf.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (private cause of action against accountants). For application of a conflict of laws analysis to professional responsibility standards,
see Fiflis, Choice ofFederalor State Lawfor At orneys' ProfessionalResponsibilityin Securities Matters, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1236 (1981).
126. Sutton, How Vulnerable isthe Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 57 N.C.L. REV.
497 (1979). Professor Sutton was the Reporter for the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards which drafted the Model Code.
127. Id at 514.
128. Id
129. Id at 514-16. See Lindgren, Towarda New StandardofAttorney Disqualfication,
1982 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 421. In its response to the SEC's request for comments,
the ABA distinguished disciplinary rules from ethical considerations, citing the administrative law judge's ruling in In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
82,175 at 82,181-84 (Mar. 7, 1979), rev'd, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
S 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981). ABA Secton of Corp., Banking and Business Law, Statement
Pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,724, at 14-17 (July 3, 1979) (on file
with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS). According to the statement,
the administrative law judge made no finding which supported a violation of disciplinary
rules, but rather extensively discussed alleged violations of ethical considerations. Id. The
statement concluded by voicing its disagreement with the admininstrative law judge's conclusion that an attorney is required
as a matter of competence, professional responsibility or securities law compliance to bring disagreements with management as to legal matters to the attention
of his client's board of directors, at least in the absence of knowledge by a lawyer
of a conflict between the interests of the corporation and those of the officers with
whom he deals.
Id at 17.
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regulate the practice of law reflect a delicate balance between
"regulatory laws, standards of recommended normalprofessional
practices, and ethical norms of aspirations and professional objectives."' 13 ° Dean Sutton recommended a revision of the Model
Code in which future disciplinary standards would3 be "realistic
'
and susceptible of uniform, regular enforcement."' '
A single, uniform statement of standards of professional re-

sponsibility for attorneys is not possible in the United States because of the myriad authorities adopting these standards. Yet the
legal profession does have a basic norm to govern its conduct:
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility or its successor.
This norm reflects the beliefs of a significant segment of the legal
profession at a particular point in time on the proper balance between regulatory laws, recommended professional practices, and
ethical aspirations. Permitting a federal agency to operate outside
this general framework by allowing it to impose ad hoc substantive, regulatory laws would seem divisive. In addition, attorneys
practicing before the agency could be placed in conflict with

mainstream standards of professional responsibility
or in violation
132
of standards set by licensing authorities.

It is interesing that the SEC in Carter declined to make use of the Model Code's disciplinary rules in evaluating the conduct of the respondents and instead announced a new
interpretation of rule 2(e) which apparently is not grounded in the Model Code. See [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,170 n.65.
130. Sutton, supra note 126, at 517 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Letter from John F. Sutton, Jr. to the author (May 4, 1982) (on file with
the Case Western Law Review and the ACUS). Dean Sutton stated:
At the time the Wright Committee was preparing the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the members of the Committee definitely thought the Code should
apply to all conduct of all lawyers in all situations before all bodies. In other
words, they intended for the disciplinary rules to constitute the regulatory law but
realized, of course, that the disciplinary rules would be effective only when
adopted by an authority having jurisdiction to discipline lawyers. In addition to
the Supreme Court of each state, they thought, I believe, that the federal courts
would use the rules in that fashion; and at least, I am sure that Justice Charles
Whitaker so believed. At the same time, they felt it would be divisive and would
probably present conflicting standards to lawyers if agencies (whether State or
Federal) adopted separate disciplinary or regulatory law. On the other hand, obviously different agencies proceed in varying ways and professional norms might
well differ when practicing before various kinds of courts and agencies. ...
My own belief is that agencies should not adopt separate administrative codes
for conduct of lawyers but should seek to amend the Code or the Model Rules if a
change is desirable.
Id. at 1; see also Letter from Andrew L. Kaufman to the author (May 24, 1982) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS). Professor Kaufman stated:
My primary concern is that practicing lawyers not be subjected to conflicting
standards of professional conduct. It is difficult enough for lawyers to figure out
what their obligations to their clients and to society are without at the same time
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In 1975, Justice Potter Stewart recognized that until society defines the role of a business lawyer, it cannot determine "what ethical judgments are best left in the public interest-not to a code of

professional responsbility, but to individual conscience."'133 Two
years earlier inln re Grfiths,1 34 the majority and dissenting members of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the special relationship between attorneys and government. Justice Powell delivered the
opinion of the Court and noted that although attorneys often are
considered "'officers of the court'. . . an attorney [is] not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term."1 35 Justice Powell

pointed out that although attorneys do "occupy professional positions of responsibility and influence that impose on them duties

correlative with their vital right of access to the courts[,] they are
[neither] officials of government [nor] formulator[s] of government
poicy. '' t36 The two dissenters, especially Chief Justice Burger,

agreed with the majority on this point:
Whatever the erosion of the officer-of-the-court role, the overbeing subjected to multiple varying standards from different bodies that may have
some authority over them. As the practice of law is currently organized, the codes
of professional responsibility presently adopted in the various states represent the
primary sources of lawyers' obligations. I understand the concerns that impel
various state and federal agencies to consider the imposition of additional obligations. It may be that there are truly unique circumstances that might justify particular agencies in adopting rules to cover particular situations that are left
uncovered by those codes. Most such proposals, however, while they may involve
special situations, also involve the possibility of concurrent application of the
state law of professional responsibility, and I am fearful that any opening of the
door to so-called "special situations" will result in the promulgation of many
rules that will put lawyers who genuinely care about their professional duty in
very difficult situations.
Id. at . Professor Kaufman is the author of A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1976).

133. Stewart, ProfessionalEthicsfor the Business Lawyer: Morals of the Market Place,
31 Bus. LAw. 463, 468 (1975). Justice Stewart also raised a number of related questions:
[A]side from the inescapable responsibility that his profession places upon
every lawyer to act as a wholly honorable and trustworthy person and a good law
abiding citizen, is there any way in which a business lawyer can better serve the
public interest than by giving the best possible legal advice to his clients? Is it the
duty of a lawyer, by contrast, to try to impose upon his clients his own notions of
social, or political or economic morality? Is it indeed even "ethical" for him to try
to impose his own system of moral priorities and social values on his clients' business decisions, in the guise of neutral legal advice? Id.
134. 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding that exclusion of resident aliens from practice of law
is unconstitutional).
135. Id. at 728-9 (quoting Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956)); see also
Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (discussing meaning of attorneys as "officers of the court").
136. 413 U.S. at 729.
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whelming proportion of the legal profession rejects the alien

idea that [an attorney] is an agent of government ...
The very independence of the lawyer from the government
on the one hand and client on the other is what makes law a

profession, something apart from trades and vocations in which
obligations of duty and conscience play a lesser part. It is as
crucial to our system of justice as the independence of judges
themselves ...
In some countries the legal system is so structured that all
lawyers are literally agents of government and as such bound to
place the interests of government over those of the client. That
concept is . . .alien to our system .... 137

The legislative history of the Agency Practice Act 38 supports
the statement in Touche Ross that the SEC has implied authority
to promulgate standards "to protect the integrity of its administrative procedures."' 3 9 The court's further conclusion that the SEC
has implied authority to prescribe professional standards "to protect. . . the public in general,"' 14 however, overstates the power
of the SEC, and could lead to attempts like that of the SEC in
Carter: enlistment of attorneys as agents of the government.' 4 '

Commissioner Karmel insisted that use of rule 2(e) to implement
a professional protection program exceeds the disciplinary powers
137. Id. at 732, 733. The other dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, recorded his thoughts in a
companion case to Gr7iths, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1982).
139. 609 F.2d at 582. In light of this legislative history, one can reasonably conclude
that Congress intended to leave with federal agencies the authority to promulgate "traditional" standards of professional conduct relating to maintenance of order in and integrity
of agency proceedings. The SEC's opinion in Carter contains a representative sample of
the legislative history on this point:
For example, in discussing the bill which ultimately was enacted, Congressman
Willis stated that "[i]t
does not affect the power of agencies to discipline persons
who appear before them.". . . Similarly, Representative Poffremarked: "The bill
in no way modifies the authority of agencies to discipline persons before them."
. . . Further, the Senate Report on this proposed law stated: "If matters of ethical conduct are brought to the attention of the agencies, adequate tools are at their
disposal to deal with the situation.". . . And, in a letter to Senator Eastland, then
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach confirmed the Administration's understanding that the bill "does not modify the authority of agencies to discipline
persons appearing before them." He remarked that the Department of Justice
"ha[d] eliminated formal admission procedures and special examinations for
practice before the administrative boards and agencies under its supervision. The
Department, however, has retained the power to discipline attorneys." Further,
after noting that "[t]he bill retains in Federal agencies an element of control, particularly in disciplinary situations," he concluded that, "[slubject to the foregoing,
the Department favors enactment of the measure."
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,148 n.9 (citations omitted).
140. 609 F.2d at 582.
141. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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of the SEC and opens a "Pandora's Box of misguided standardsetting regulation." 142 Although the SEC may currently be in the
process of reassessing its approach to regulating attorneys who

practice before it, 143 this assessment may change with future personnel changes. Not to be overlooked, however, is that other
agencies may seize on the language of Touche Ross and enact similar attorney regulations. Congress should therefore amend the
Agency Practice Act to clarify the authority of those agencies
which depend on implied powers to regulate the attorneys practicing before them. Congressional resolution of the authority issue
would also satisfy the ABA's need for clear statements on attorney
conduct standards and disciplinary responsibility.
C.

CongressionalAlternativesfor the Regulation of Standards

Congress has several regulatory alternatives if it decides to address the need for standards of conduct for attorneys practicing
before federal agencies.'" Congress could choose to renounce its
authority and defer to state regulation,
although positive federal
14 5
regulation appears more likely.
142. Keating, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 82,124 at 81,997 (use
of rule 2(e) to implement program of professional protection is not limiting its disciplinary
powers to assuring proper administration of justice). Commissioner Karmel described
Carter with similar disapproval. See Karmel Blasts SEC Discilineof Lawyers, 67 A.B.A.
J. 1097 (1981).
Thomas Lumbard has suggested an approach which would facilitate greater supervision of attorney conduct in the stcurities area:
The solution to many of the agencies' problems, it seems to me, is more imaginative use of their power to regulate "practice and procedure," qua practice and
procedure, rather than the power to regulate the conduct of practitioners. If the
SEC wants lawyers to make inquiries not normally required of counsel for parties, the SEC can require that certain papers must be accompanied by an affidavit
of counsel that such inquiries have been made, and that counsel is satisfied that
the statements in the prospectus, or the 10-K, or the annual report, are neither
false nor misleading. A lawyer would be disbarred for making a false affidavit of
that sort to the SEC, just as a lawyer would be disbarred for making a false certificate of good faith in a federal court that required a pleading to be accompanied
thereby.
Letter from Thomas Lumbard to the author 5 (Apr. 12, 1982) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
143. See, e.g., Address by SEC General Counsel Edward F. Greene, New York County
Lawyers' Association (Jan. 13, 1982), reprintedin Legal Times (Wash.), Jan. 25, 1982, at 25,
col. 1.
144. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text, for a discussion of Congress' authority to regulate attorney conduct before administrative agencies.
145. Speakers before the 1982 ABA House of Delegates who favored the Franck Proposal, supra note 6, forcefully pointed out that Congress was unlikely to leave all attorney
regulation to the states. Congress could also adopt legislation holding an attorney appearing before a federal agency to the standards of the state in which he is licensed to practice.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:173

Express authorization to each federal agency to adopt its own
standards would likely be the simplest and least costly alternative.
This option, however, might result in balkanization of standards

among the profusion of federal agencies, proscriptions potentially
inconsistent with the overall responsibilities of attorneys, and potential enlistment of attorneys to enforce substantive law via ethical standards. A superior, albeit costlier, alternative would be
congressionally mandated uniform standards, with the possibility

of additional standards necessitated by individual agency
requirements. 146
Uniform standards might best solve the problems posed by individual agency regulation, but they would probably increase the
complexity and cost of controlling attorney conduct. A lack of
data on the extent and nature of attorney misconduct makes difficult a determination of whether such complex and costly regulation is justified. Extensive misconduct may exist but agencies
often fail to document it. 147 For example, instances of attorney
misconduct before the SEC are not recorded and filed separately
This system, however, would engender inconsistency and confusion since attorneys in the
same proceeding could be held to different standards of conduct. Thus, standards should
be promulgated, if at all, by an authority on the federal level. Federal control of attorneys
is not a new idea, as was pointed out to the 1982 ABA House of Delegates, since attorneys
are subject to the disciplinary standards of federal courts.
146. Of the federal agencies responding to the Federal Questionnaire, see supra note
77, approximately 66% indicated that uniform standards were unnecessary. See infra appendix A, question 8; supra note 13. In addition almost 50% said that they had enacted
satisfactory particularized standards for their agencies. See infra appendix A, questions 3
& 5; supra note 13. On the other hand, if uniform standards were promulgated, almost 70%
of those responding believed that no agency should be exempted from the uniform standards. See infra appendix A, question 10; supra note 13.
If uniform standards were promulgated, agencies should be permitted to present their
requirements for particularized standards. Prohibition of particularized standards at the
outset would oversimplify the complexities facing agencies. See, e.g., Marquis, An Appraisalof Attorneys' ResponsibilitiesBefore Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE. W. REs. L.
REV. 285, 290-314 (1976).
147. See ABA Nat'l Center for Professional Responsibilities, Attorney Misconduct
Before Eleven Federal Agencies (Mar. 10, 1982) (included infra appendix C) (illustrating
difficulties in documenting misconduct). Of the 36 licensing authorities that responded to
the State Questionnaire, over 25% said that they had no statistics on misconduct by attorneys before federal agencies and over 20% failed to answer this question, which suggests an
absence of data. See infra appendix B, question 11; supra note 13.
As with admission to practice before federal agencies, see supra notes 95-99, information on attorney misconduct is valuable to the agencies, clients, and practitioners. In 1968,
the ABA Board of Governors established the National Discipline Data Bank to compile
data on attorney misconduct. The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility currently
administers the Data Bank. Letter from Pamela L. Ross, Data Bank Adm'r, to National
Discipline Data Bank Reporting Authorities 1 (Feb. 1983) (on'file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review).
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but remain buried in the SEC general files.148
Although Congress has the authority, it should not draft and
enact standards itself.' 49 Congress is not the appropriate group to
undertake deliberations of the nature and potential duration required to produce professional guidelines. Standards of conduct
for the practice of law should not be drafted in the political and
partisan atmosphere of Congress. The process should be a concentrated effort not subject to preemption by more urgent matters.
In addition, noncongressional promulgation would provide
greater flexibility for the agencies and the legal profession than
rigid statutory guidelines. Congress, therefore, should delegate
the responsibility for formulating standards of conduct, ensuring
only that any standards ultimately adopted are within the mainstream of current legal thinking on professional responsibility.
Possible delegates include the federal judiciary, an ad hoc body,
or a new or existing agency.
Delegation to the federal judiciary would be inappropriate, despite that branch's experience with attorney discipline. The issue
in question is not misconduct by judicially admitted attorneys
before federal courts, but rather misconduct by congressionally
admitted attorneys before federal agencies. 5 Some of the objecConversations between various agency personnel and the author have indicated that
information regarding disciplinary action by one agency is not being received by other
agencies. A need remains, therefore, to establish such a mechanism. One possible and,
quite probably, low-cost solution would be to designate the Office of Government Ethics as
a central clearinghouse for such information. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying
text. The Office would be authorized to require each agency to provide information on all
attorney misconduct proceedings involving that agency. The Office then would compile
and publish the information in the Federal Register. The availability of this data also
should improve the ability to assess the effectiveness of imposed standards and disciplinary
mechanisms.
148. The SEC has begun to review its files to identify instances of potential attorney
misconduct; the results are not yet available. See Letter from Stephan E. Canan to the
author 2 (May 13, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the
ACUS). Subsequent oral communications between the author and Paul Gonson, SEC Solicitor, indicate that the review is not yet completed.
149. The Federal Questionnaire asked agencies to choose among alternative promulgators of uniform standards: the ABA, the federal courts, Congress, an ad hoe group of
attorneys and agency personnel, or another group. See infra appendix A, question 9; supra
note 13. Although the responses were somewhat inconclusive, general counsels gave little
support to congressional promulgation, while chief administrative law judges tended to
prefer Congress.
150. Although the Agency Practice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1982), provides that an attorney licensed by and currently in good standing with a state court may practice before federal agencies, a state license is not in and of itself the authority enabling an attorney to
practice before federal agencies. Congress theoretically could have set some other requirement such as a federal bar examination. Indeed, a state license to practice law does not
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tions to congressional enactment of standards are equally applicable to judicial promulgation: The process could be lengthy and
partisan in nature, and involve resources beyond those reasonably
available to the judiciary. The judiciary itself has resisted the responsibility of promulgating standards.'
Formation of an ad hoe body to promulgate standards suffers
the severe shortcoming of being temporary. Ideally the body
should be available to make changes in and issue interpretations
of standards as the need arises. An ad hoe group would likely
promulgate and then disband, and thus could not perform ongoing responsibilities. 512
Establishment of a new agency is not financially justified at
this time, given the absence of clear documentation of attorney
misconduct before federal agencies. Nevertheless, assigning the
responsibilities to an existing agency with expertise in the area of
ethical standards would seem appropriate. Ideally an agency with
established personnel, procedures, and experience could perform
the required rulemaking and ongoing responsibilities without a
prohibitive increase in funding. This agency arguably exists.
53
In 1978, Congress created the Office of Government Ethics,
inter alia, to "centralize executive branch responsibility for enforcement. . . ; provide guidance to agencies; issue clear and understandable standards of conduct . . .;[and] provide advisory
opinions. ' The Office's statutory objective is to "prevent...
conflicts of interest on the part of officers and employees of any
executive agency, as defined in Section 105 of Title 5. 's Section
105's definition of "executive agency" includes so-called "inentitle a person to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office; Congress empowered
that agency to impose its own requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 500(e) (1982).
151. The judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia unanimously rejected the Franck Proposal's recommendation that the judiciary promulgate uniform standards. See Letter from Chief Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr. to Jeanne P. Gray
(Mar. 5, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS). Federal
Questionnaire responses reflected little support for judicial promulgation of uniform standards. See infra appendix A, question 9; supra note 13.
152. The responses of general counsels to the Federal Questionnaire indicated some
support for promulgation of federal standards of conduct by an ad hoc group of attorneys
and agency personnel. See infra appendix A, question 9; supra note 13. The other possible
adhoc groups found little support. The most popular "other" selection was the ACUS.
See supra note 149.
153. Ethics in Government Act, Title IV,§ 401, 5 U.S.C. app. § 401 (1982).
154. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4246, 4247.
155. 5 U.S.C. app. § 402 (1982).
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dependent establishments," such as the SEC.'5 6 The Office of
Government Ethics has promulgated uniform standards of ethical
conduct through the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 57
These regulations require that each agency promulgate its own
standards containing at minimum the uniform standards, as well
as any additional standards not inconsistent with the uniform
standards and "appropriate to the particular functions and activities of the agency," subject to OPM approval. 5 8 The use of the
Office of Government Ethics-an existing agency with expertise in
the area of ethical standards-seems to be the least expensive and

most attractive choice.
Selecting the best promulgator of standards is important because professional responsibility for attorneys benefits both the legal profession and the public. In recent years, beginning with the
revelations of attorney misconduct associated with Watergate, at-

torney ethicality and professionalism have been called into question. By placing responsibility for professional standards with the
Office of Government Ethics, Congress can send a message to the
American public that the federal government is serious about requiring attorneys at the federal level to be professional and ethical. Congress should amend the Agency Practice and Ethics in
Government Acts to assign to the Office of Government Ethics

responsibility for developing and monitoring uniform standards
of conduct for attorneys practicing before all federal agencies.' 5 9

156. "For purposes of this title, 'Executive agency' means an executive department, a
Government corporation, and an independent establishment." Id. § 105. The legislative
history of the 1979 amendments to the Ethics in Government Act clearly indicates that this
definition of "executive agency" includes independent regulatory commissions such as the
SEC. See H. REP. No. 114, 96th Cong., IstSess. 3, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 145.
157. See 5 C.F.R. § 735 (1983).
158. Id. § 735.104(a), (f).
159. The responsibility for promulgating and monitoring the standards should be assigned to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics through legislation similar to
§§ 402-04 of the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 402-04. Section 405 of the
Act, id. § 405, should be amended to ensure adequate appropriations. See infra note 216.
The standards promulgated should be published in the Code of Federal Regulations and
should be uniform except for additional standards designed to meet special needs of particular agencies and approved by the OPM.
Were the standards of conduct also applied to government attorneys, the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics should then be responsible for receiving, filing, and prosecuting misconduct charges against agency staff attorneys, through amendment of §§ 402- 04 of
the Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 402-04. See infra note 216. See also Letter from Professor Peter
L. Strauss, Columbia Law School, to the author 2 (May 6, 1982) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) (discussing OPM participation in adjudicating complaints of attorney misconduct).
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The Office should implement this function in the same manner as
it has carried out its responsibilities relating to conflict of interest

standards.
D.

Standardsof Conductfor Nonlawyers andAgency Attorneys

Any uniform standards drafted to define the professional conduct of attorneys practicing before federal agencies must address a
number of related issues. One is whether laypersons permitted to
appear before a particular federal agency should be subject to the
same standards of conduct as attorneys. Although this Article is
not intended to discuss regulation of laypersons, 160 Congress
could apply these proposals to nonlawyers as well.
In 1975, Joseph Daley and Roberta Karmel noted that the
SEC maintains a double standard by expecting private practioners
to assume duties shirked by its own staff attorneys.' 6 ' This observation raises two issues: (1) whether uniform standards should
apply to both private practitioners and government attorneys and

(2) whether a government attorney can be prohibited from practicing before federal agencies due to dismissal for misconduct by

his employer despite lack of action on the misconduct by his state
licensing authority. 6 2 The Agency Practice Act appears to apply
the same standards to both private practitioners and government
attorneys by requiring only that the attorney be a member in good
standing of a state bar to practice before a federal agency. 63 Subjecting government attorneys to the same standards as private
160. Jonathan Rose of Arizona State University College of Law, as a consultant for the
ACUS, is currently studying the regulation of nonlawyers practicing before federal
agencies.
161. Daley & Karmel, supra note 122, at 812.
162. The observations made are not limited to private practitioners not subject to the
local discipline authority, but apply with equal force to government attorneys not employed within their licensing states.
163. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1982). The Act may permit prohibiting a dismissed agency
attorney from practicing before the dismissing agency. See id. § 500(d)(3) (Act does not
"authorize an individual who is a former employee of an agency to represent a person
before an agency when the representation is prohibited by statute or regulation"). The
sparse legislative history on this section, however, indicates that the exception was included
so as not to "modify the authority of agencies to. . . prevent former employees from representing persons appearing before the agencies to avoid conflict-of-interestsituations." Letter
from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Sen. James 0. Eastland (June 10, 1963), reprintedin
1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4178 (emphasis added).
Professor Weckstein also concluded that the purpose of this section was to avoid conflicts of interests. Weckstein, supra note 75, at 65-66. Thus, it is unclear whether an agency
may deny eligibility to practice before it to a dismissed employee whose appearance would
not create a conflict of interest. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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the double standard discussed by
practitioners might 6eliminate
4
Karmel.1
and
Daley
Unique ethical quandaries may arise when an administrative
agency deals with clients of private practitioners. Response to
such situations may depend on whether the attorney is in-house or
retained counsel. 6 5 It is unclear whether the ABA Model Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility or its successor adequately resolves
these problems or whether special standards are required. Furthermore, one must inquire whether the ABA recommendations
on professional responsibility are too much of a compromise work
product produced by a "political adoption process"' 166 or emphasize too strongly the adversary environment of trial-oriented law
practice to resolve the problem. 167 Either characteristic may
render the recommendations unsuitable as a model for uniform
standards of conduct for attorneys practicing before federal
agencies.
E. Potential Conflicts Between State and FederalStandards
The promulgating federal authority must assess the impact of
subjecting an attorney practicing before federal agencies to professional standards greatly at variance from those of his licensing
state(s). If a conflict between state and federal standards exists, an
attorney may choose the stricter standard to insure avoidance of
disciplinary action. This approach assumes that an attorney
knows he is subject to both standards. Consider an attorney far
removed from Washington, D.C., who gives a client advice involving a federal agency. Does that act of advising bring the attorney within the coverage of federal standards? If it does, would
the attorney be reasonably expected to understand that giving the
advice subjects him to another professional responsibility regulatory system? The group authorized to promulgate these standards, whether it be ad hoc or an existing agency, must resolve
these issues.
As a basic threshold issue, the promulgators of the standards
must determine the types of misconduct to which federal uniform
164. If federal agencies are to have the authority to deny eligibility to an attorney disciplined by a federal agency, Congress must amend the Agency Practice Act. See supra note

94.
165.
sel, 33
166.
167.

See Pickholz, supra note 108, at 1854-55; Subak, Special Problems of Inside CounBus. LAW. 1433 (1978).
Sutton, supra note 126, at 497.
Marquis, supra note 146, at 285.
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standards should apply. Misconduct generally falls into three categories. The narrowest and most easily defined category is contu-

macious behavior committed during a specific agency proceeding.
The Waxman/Forrest Proposal t68 addresses this form of misconduct, limiting application of federal standards to situations "af-

fecting [an] attorney's participation in a particular proceeding
before it, as immediately necessary to maintain order in and assure the integrity of such proceeding."'' 69 A second, arguably
broader category of misconduct includes actual and representative
appearances before an agency. The Franck Proposal covers this

category, applying federal standards to "Direct Appearances[-]
an actual appearance before the agency in a hearing or similar

proceeding or the filing with an agency of a document which is
signed by, or otherwise submitted on the authority of the practitioner."' ° The third and most controversial category of potential
misconduct involves an attorney's duty to conform to standards
involving an agency's substantive regulatory responsibilities. The
SEC in Carter defined this duty during its discussion of an attorney's duty to encourage clients to comply with securities law disclosure requirements.'
An agency's subjection of an attorney to standards of conduct
and discipline without adequate notice of the regulatory system's
jurisdiction has constitutional overtones.' 72 The United States
Supreme Court consistently has held that the right to practice law
may not be taken away without due process 173 and that due pro168. See supra note 7.
169. Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7, at 2. Some courts and commentators
have argued that individual agencies should be permitted to adopt their own standards for
this type of misconduct. See, e.g., Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952) (discussing NLRB's power to regulate admission to practice before it, based on misconduct
during a proceeding). Such opinions undermine the objective of uniform standards. No
compelling reason exists to treat standards governing contumacious behavior differently
than other standards, especially if individual agencies can adopt additional standards on a
showing of necessity. See supra note 159.
170. See Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at 4. Rule 3 of this proposal, however, cautions that "[tihe jurisdiction conferred by these rules shall not be construed to deny to any
agency the powers immediately necessary to maintain control over its proceedings." Id. at
10.
171. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,172. See supra
notes 102-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Carter rationale.
172. For a discussion of the notice of jurisdiction requirement, see R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.4 (2d ed. 1980).
173. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-52 0968); Theard v. United States, 354
U.S 278, 282 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Ex
Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873).
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cess necessarily includes adequate notice. 7 4 Standards that assume that every attorney who has a client with an administrative
law question has the responsibility and practical ability to review
all the applicable rules and regulations prior to giving any advice,
oversimplify the realitites of practicing law. Many attorneys do
not have ready access to either the Code of FederalRegulations or
the FederalRegister. The dividing line between applicability of
federal and state standards of conduct must satisfy due process
and will do so only if that line is readily recognizable. Where
federal and state standards conflict, the proper response is not necessarily to apply the strictest standard but rather to apply federal
standards where they may constitutionally be applied and state
standards elsewhere. Violations of federal standards should be
pursued in a federal forum, leaving enforcement of state standards
to the states.
IV. DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS PRACTICING
BEFORE FEDERAL AGENCIES

Standards without effective enforcement benefit no one. The
final aspect of attorney regulation, therefore, involves choosing an
appropriate disciplinary body or mechanism to sanction violators
of federal conduct standards. Officials at the SEC have indicated
"that federal administrative agencies are unlikely to voluntarily
cease the disciplining of attorneys and other professionals for misconduct unless a substitute mechanism that is truly effective becomes available."'' On the other hand, the SEC does "not
oppose the creation of an independent model disciplinary mechaof the need to
nism [as] such a body would relieve the agencies
176
task."
this
to
resources
scarce
devote their
A.

The Recommendations of the Franck and
Waxman/ForrestProposals

Both the Franck and Waxman/Forrest Proposals recommended new disciplinary procedures. 177 The House of Delagates
174. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
175. Ferrara/Gonson Proposal, supra note 23, at 3.
176. Letter from Paul Gonson to Michael Franck 1 (July 28, 1982) (on file with the
Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS). The letter reiterated the position taken

earlier by SEC officials that any nonagency disciplinary mechanism must be "truly
effective."
177. See supra notes 6-7.
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adopted the Waxman/Forrest Proposal's recommendation, 78
which is considerably shorter and less complicated than that of the
Franck Proposal.179

The underlying concept of the Waxman/Forrest Proposal was
the use of state disciplinary mechanisms to pursue allegations of
conduct proscribed by state standards committed by attorneys
practicing before federal agencies. 8" Although emphasis on state
regulation may appeal to a state-oriented body like the ABA
House of Delegates, Congress is unlikely to abandon its power in
this area without convincing evidence that state regulation would
be effective.' 8 1 Implementation of the Waxman/Forrest Proposal
178. The Waxman/Forrest Proposal endorses the enactment of legislation which
would provide that: ...
1. Except as existing legislation expressly provides, no federal agency shall
adopt standards of practice to govern the professional conduct of attorneys who
represent clients subject to the administrative procedures of or regulation by that
federal agency, except such standards of practice as required to apply subparagraph 2(b) below to maintain order in or assure the integrity of proceedings
before it.
2. Except as existing legislation expressly provides, a federal agency shall
exercise disciplinary authority over an attorney only:
(a) in conformity with formal disciplinary action taken against such attorney
in a jurisdiction where such attorney is admitted to practice; or
(b) affecting such attorney's participation proceeding in a particular proceeding before it, as immediately necessary to maintain order in or assure the integrity
of such proceeding.
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recognizes that
it is important that state disciplinary authorities afford federal agencies an effective means of securing review of charges by such federal agencies of professional
misconduct arising out of the practice of attorneys before the agencies; and that it
is a matter of clear and important policy of the American Bar Association to
encourage and assist state disciplinary authorities to fulfill this function.
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association authorizes the
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline to initiate and coordinate efforts
to assure that state disciplinary authorities function in a manner which provides
federal agencies with an effective forum to which professional responsibility complaints arising out of agency practice can be brought; and, to this end, the Standing Committee shall establish liaison with appropriate state bar associations or
other groups within each state which would directly undertake these efforts at the
state level.
Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7, at 1-2.
179. Although the recommendation in the Franck proposal was less than a half page, it
incorporated by reference nine definitions and twenty-four proposed "Rules for Federal
Agency Discipline," and thus is not reproduced here. See Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at
i, 4-46.
180. See Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7, at 1-2.
181. Proponents of the Franck Proposal raised this concern during the debate of the
Waxman/Forrest Proposal on the floor of the ABA House of Delegates. The references to
the House of Delegates' discussion of the Franck and Waxman/Forrest Proposals are
based on the author's observations of the debate. See supra note 13. In particular, they
argued that uniform federal standards would ensure that attorneys from different states
would be subject to the same standards, rather than differing state standards, when practicing before federal agencies.
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thus does not realistically commend itself.
The Franck Proposal's main features can be described briefly:
(1) in general, removal of federal agencies' jurisdiction to conduct
attorney misconduct proceedings, (2) referral of complaints of attomey misconduct before federal agencies to the bar counsel of
the attorney's licensing state, who would investigate the charges
and prosecute the case before an appropriate United States district
court, and (3) promulgation of uniform standards of conduct by
8 2
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.1
Two positive contributions of the Franck Proposal were identification of a forum to adjudicate allegations of attorney misconduct
before federal agencies, i.e., federal district court, and recognition
that as a general principle the federal agencies should not promulgate standards of conduct.
The Franck Proposal's suggested methods of implementation,
however, included a number of features which reduced its overall
attractiveness. Foremost was its use of state bar counsels to investigate and to prosecute alleged violations of federal standards.
Eighty-six percent of the jurisdictions responding to the State
Questionnaire indicated that they "only [had] authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney licensed to practice by [their] state
for a violation of a standard adopted by some official body (e.g.,
court, legislature, bar association) of [their] state."' 1 3 In other
words, the overwhelming majority of bar counsel responding does
not appear to have authority to use state resources to enforce federal standards, thus undermining a fundamental part of the
Franck Proposal. The Waxman/Forrest Proposal pointed to the
same problem but from a different perspective:
While Congress can condition the grant of federal funds upon
state adoption and enforcement of related state laws (e.g., conditioning highway funds upon state adoption and enforcement
of a 55 mph speed limit), it is extremely doubtful that Congress
can require the states to use their executive powers to enforce a
federal law or regulation. . . . Thus, even if Congress were to
adopt the. . . extraordinary provision that with regard to the
federally adopted standards state disciplinary enforcement authorities "shall . .. [plerform all prosecutorial functions including investigation," it is questionable whether those
Concern over the "hiatus in the effective discipline of many lawyers in the Administrative Law practice" is not new. HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20.
at 308; see CLARK REPORT, supra note 21, at 67-70. These concerns still appear to be
warranted today. See supra notes 22-23 & 25.
182. Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at i, 5-46.
183. See infra appendix B, question 2; supra note 13.
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84
authorities would have to comply.'
Other objections to implementing the Franck Proposal included: (1) the fact that attorneys could still be required to enforce substantive agency policies and face confficting state and
federal standards, (2) the reluctance of the District Court for the
District of Columbia to promulgate standards, (3) the lack of an
authoritative source to monitor the standards, (4) the lack of uniformity of enforcement because state bar counsels would have significant prosecutorial discretion, and (5) the complexity of the
"Rules for Federal Agency Discipline."'' 8 5 These concerns might
have been overcome by congressional action. Their presence,
however, reinforced the House of Delegates' inclination to adopt a
strong, state-oriented position on discipline of attorneys practicing
before federal agencies-the Waxman/Forrest Proposal.
The two proposals agreed in one major aspect: Except for misconduct affecting the order or integrity of a specific agency proceeding, authority to discipline misconduct before federal
agencies should be removed from the agencies. 8 6 The two proposals differed, however, in that the proposal adopted by the House
of Delegates excepts from this proscription agencies with express
disciplinary authority-the Treasury Department and the Patent
and Trademark Office' 87 -while the Franck Proposal does not.
The primary reason for removing attorney discipline from substantive agencies is the corruption that can result from vesting one
entity with both the responsibility to prosecute and the power to
sanction attorneys appearing before it.188 The practical reason for
exempting Treasury and the Patent and Trademark Office is that
they apparently do a good job and have the support of attorneys
practicing before them. 8 9 As Congress has expressly granted
these agencies the authority, 9 ° such delegations should not be disturbed without a compelling reason.
184. Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7, at 12 (quoting earlier draft of Franck
Proposal). In an attempt to accommodate this criticism, the ABA House of Delegates
amended the Franck Proposal to allow prosecution of alleged violations by district court
bar members if state bar counsel declines to prosecute. See supra note 181.
185. These objections were raised during the ABA House of Delegates' debate on the
Franck and Waxman/Forrest Proposals. See supra note 181.
186. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
187. Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra note 7, at 1, 8. At least one other agency has
express authority. See supra note 116.
188. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text; Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at
2-3.
189. See supra note 45.
190. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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The issues involved in choosing an appropriate enforcement
agent are similar to those involved in selecting an appropriate promulgator. The conclusion, arguably, should be similar: Deny the
agencies authority to discipline attorneys unless Congress has expressly granted this power to a particular agency.
B. Agencies' Opinions on a CentralizedAuthority
Based on responses to the Federal Questionnaire, most agencies appear to oppose the removal of this authority from the individual agencies. Of the twenty-seven responses received, only
four-the general counsels of the ICC and the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the chief administrative law judges of the ICC
and the Food and Drug Administration-approved of the establishment of a centralized disciplinary authority.' 9 1 A given
agency's disapproval of a centralized authority may be a function
of that agency's low incidence of attorney misconduct, indicating
either ignorance of the complexities involved in dealing with attorey misconduct or a well-founded belief that this authority is
not needed. Only two responses opposing a centralized authority
(other than Treasury and Patent and Trademark-both express
authority agencies) were from personnel of agencies reporting
more than two instances of attorney misconduct annually: the
SEC and the Department of Health and Human Services. 192 As a
consequence, insofar as the views of the officials responding to the
Federal Questionnaire reflect their agencies' positions, opposition
to the concept of centralizing attorney discipline appears generally
to come from agencies that do not have significant experience with
the problem.
The responses of both the general counsel and the chief administrative law judge of the ICC, favoring a centralized discipli193
nary authority as well as uniform standards, are noteworthy.
The ICC has a long history of establishing and enforcing its own
standards of conduct for attorneys practicing before it. In 1930,
practitioners before the ICC adopted canons of ethics. These canons were adopted in turn by the ICC and remain, in revised
191. See infra appendix A, question 13; supra note 13.
192. See infra appendix A, question 19; supra note 13. The SEC chief administrative
law judge's response opposing a centralized authority may not reflect the general consensus
at the SEC. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. The SEC general counsel did
not return the questionnaire.
193. See infra appendix A, questions 13 & 8; supra note 13.
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form, part of its rules governing practice. 9 4 Nonetheless, the acting director of the ICC's Office of Compliance and Consumer
Assistance stated: "This office favors the creation of a centralized
authority to handle attorney disciplinary matters. Ideally, such an
office could process discipline cases more efficiently than the individual agency. It is our feeling that discipline cases demand an
inordinate amount of the agency's enforcement effort."' 9 5 The
ICC thus appears to be the only responding agency which has significant disciplinary experience and yet favors the establishment
of a centralized disciplinary authority.
C.

The Appropriate Entity To DiscoilineAttorneys

The two proposals presented to the 1982 ABA House of Delegates differed substantially on the question who should take responsibility for attorney discipline if federal agencies do not. The
Waxman/Forrest proposal adopted by the House of Delegates
recommended state agencies; the Franck Proposal recommended
an appropriate federal district court, with the bar counsel of the
attorney's licensing state as prosecutor.
In 1980 when the ABA first began to consider these issues, one
basic concern was the extent to which state agency staff and resources were inadequate to discipline federal agency practitioners.' 96 This concern was never resolved. 197 Consequently, until
the states can demonstrate the availability of adequate resources
and the interest required to perform this function effectively, any
recommendation to transfer this function to the states is premature and unlikely to gain congressional approval. 198 The responsibility for disciplining attorneys practicing before federal agencies,
194. See 49 C.F.R. § 1103.10-.35 (1983); Code of Ethics ofPractitionersBefore the ICC,
17 A.B.A. J. 73 (1931).
195. Letter from Bernard Gaillard to the author 1 (June 9, 1982) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
196. 1980 ABA Standing Committee Report, supra note 22, at 5.
197. See supra notes 20-21 & 25 and accompanying text.
198. This was the conclusion of the proponents of the Franck Proposal. See supra note
181 and accompanying text. In addition, the public might misperceive such disciplinary
action by the state bars:
[l]t
would be inadvisable for the bar to seek legislation preventing agencies from
instituting disciplinary rules. . . . At this time when voices are increasingly
heard criticizing the bar's alleged self-protective posture, legislation which would
prevent agencies from taking any steps toward disciplining wayward attorneys
would be the wrong proposal at the wrong time.
Letter from Myron C. Baum to John S.Nolan 1-2 (Mar. 22, 1982) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS).
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therefore, should remain with the federal government, at least for
the foreseeable future. The question is where.
If the agencies themselves are eliminated as adjudicators, two
alternatives are available: a neutral body or the federal judiciary.
Creation of a neutral centralized authority is not realistic due to
the cost involved. The Office of Government Ethics would be an
inappropriate choice, as adjudication of this nature is not within
its current responsibilities and, thus, would require it to change its
present focus significantly. The federal courts, however, have the
support of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline' 99 and others as an appropriate forum for disciplining attorney misconduct at the federal level. Dean Thomas D. Morgan,
for example, has argued that the District Court for the District of
Columbia may be the appropriate forum. 2°° In his view, discipline of attorneys has traditionally been a judicial function and is
important enough to merit a federal court's attention. The additional burden on the court would be slight, since "the number of
these cases would be small" and "most of the reciprocal disbarment cases would be straight forward [sic] . ...
A twenty-seven page legislative proposal circulated in 1981 by
the general counsel and the solicitor of the SEC also recommends
giving the federal courts responsibility for disciplining attorneys
practicing before federal agencies. 2 ° This proposal contains
many features relevant to this discussion. First, the complaining
agency would initiate charges of attorney misconduct by filing
them under seal with the appropriate United States district court.
The court would examine the charges and accompanying documents in camera to determine whether to continue the proceeding.
If the court terminated the proceeding, the charges and accompanying documents would remain nonpublic; if it found that the
charges warranted further action, the charges would become public.2 "3 Second, venue would lie "(1) where the agency has its prin199. Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at v.
200. Letter from Thomas D. Morgan, Dean, Emory University School of Law, to Margery H. Waxman 4 (Feb. 9, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and

the ACUS).
201. Id. at 4-5; see also Ferrara/Gonson Proposal, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that cost
to federal courts "would be so slight as to not warrant funding"); Agata, Admissions and
Discipline of 4ttorneys in FederalDistrict Courts: A Study andProposedRules, 3 HOFSTRA
L. Rev. 249, 282-84 (1975) (total reliance on state disciplinary mechanisms is impermissible and federal court involvement is needed to show leadership in tackling lay criticism of

professional standards).
202. See Ferrara/Gonson Proposal, supra note 23, at 1.
203. Id. at 6.

220
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cipal office; (2) where the conduct occurred; (3) where the lawyer
maintains an office; (4) where the lawyer resides; or (5) where the
lawyer is licensed to practice law." The complaining agency
would make the initial choice of venue, but the attorney would
have an opportunity to change it.2 0° Third, agency disciplinary
authority would not be withdrawn until two years after the effective date of the legislation granting jurisdiction to the United
States district courts; i.e., concurrent jurisdiction would exist for
two years.2 °5
If the complaining agency is allowed to initiate charges and
presumably to present the case in chief, an ethical conflict may be
created for the attorney/defendant. In his own defense, he might
be forced to reveal to the court confidential communications with
a client.20 6 A federal district judge, however, should be able to
prevent improper communication of this information, for example, by issuing a protective order or by receiving the testimony in
camera. The alternative, appointing special prosecutors, probably
would be prohibitively expensive and would not be necessary unless the courts are unable to prevent agencies from abusing their
prosecutorial discretion in this regard.20 7 A requirement that the
charges be delivered under seal and the documents be kept confidential until a federal district judge determines that the charges
warrant further action serves an important purpose. It eliminates
the alleged current practice of some agencies "to institute a public
'20 8
proceeding first and to investigate later.
A flexible venue provision is preferable due to the difficulty of
predicting a convenient forum for the parties. 20 9 For example, a
204. Id. at 6-7.
205. Id. at 10.
206. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(c)(4) (1979)

("[A] lawyer may reveal.., confidences or secrets necessary to. . . defend himself...
against an accusation of wrongful conduct.").
207. If, in addition to private practitioners, agency attorneys were subject to the uniform standards and to the jurisdiction of federal district courts, see supra notes 161-64 and
accompanying text, initiation of charges and presentation of the case in chief by agency
personnel might be inappropriate. An independent party would then be required to initiate, receive, and act on complaints. See supra note 159; infra note 216.
208. Letter from Thomas Lumbard to Marcia L. Proctor 2 (Jan. 12, 1979) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS); see supra note 14 and accompanying text; Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at 28.
209. But see Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at 7 (limiting venue to licensing state or
district containing practitioner's principal office for agency practice); Letter from Thomas
D. Morgan, Dean, Emory University School of Law, to Margery H. Waxman 5 (Feb. 9,
1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review and the ACUS) (suggesting more
limited venue provision).
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case might involve an attorney who is licensed in Oregon, maintains his principal office or residence in Miami (perhaps a law professor or a retired attorney), and is charged with misconduct
before the SEC regional office in Fort Worth. Which forum
should be selected? Without more facts about the parties and the
alleged misconduct, an intelligent choice is impossible. A flexible
venue provision is necessary to accommodate these facts in a way
that facilitates efficient and fair adjudication.
The two-year period of concurrent agency and judiciary jurisdiction before withdrawal of agency disciplinary authority seems
advisable. The period of adjustment would permit an effective
system of standards and disciplinary mechanisms to begin operating before the present system is extinguished, thus maintaining a
continuous system of attorney discipline.
D. DiscoilinaryProceedingsRemaining With
The IndividualAgency
Should the federal district courts refrain from adjudicating
some types of attorney misconduct? An agency should arguably
retain the authority to discipline misconduct when the sanction
imposed affects only the attorney's participation in the proceeding
in which the misconduct occurred. This would allow an administrative law judge to exclude an attorney from a hearing because of
contumacious behavior, or an agency to suspend an attorney for
the remainder of a proceeding because the attorney filed a false
affidavit. Misconduct involving the order or integrity of a particular proceeding can thus be handled expeditiously by the agency
and would not seem to warrant judicial participation. z 0 If an
agency concludes that certain severe misconduct during a proceeding warrants sanctions extending beyond the immediate proceeding, it should file charges with the appropriate federal district
2 1

court.

'

A second type of misconduct arguably not warranting judicial
participation is a summary proceeding to determine whether an
agency should give reciprocity to the discipline imposed by another authority. Reciprocity hearings do not involve the same
separation of functions problems as adjudications of original mis210. Both the Franck and Waxman/Forrest Proposals concluded that the agencies' disciplinary authority should be limited to misconduct that disrupts the order or integrity of
their proceedings. Franck Proposal, supra note 6, at 10; Waxman/Forrest Proposal, supra
note 7, at 7; see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952).
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conduct.21 2 The agency adjudicator has not been personally of-

fended and the adjudication determines only whether reciprocity
should be granted. In addition, the agency is in a better position
to decide whether the conduct prompting the previous disciplinary
action warrants similar sanctions with respect to its own functions.
Scant justification thus exists to consume valuable judicial resources with reciprocity hearings.
Although responses to the Federal Questionnaire were mixed,
a substantial number of agencies did favor reciprocity.2 1 3 Reciprocity should not, however, be automatic; an agency should
conduct show-cause hearings which
satisfy constitutional require214
ments prior to giving reciprocity.
These recommendations on the allocation of disciplinary authority between the agencies and the judiciary should be implemented through amendment of the Agency Practice Act's
enforcement provisions. Congress should amend the Act to provide that no federal agency has authority to discipline attorneys
practicing before it except for reciprocity hearings and hearings to
adjudicate alleged misconduct affecting the order or integrity of a
proceeding, the sanction for which does not extend beyond the
duration of the proceeding. In all other instances the agency
should be required to file charges and supporting documents of
alleged attorney misconduct with the appropriate federal district
court. If the court determines further proceedings are warranted, 215 the agency should present the case in chief 216 In addi212. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
213. See infra appendix A, question 17; supra note 13.
214. See supra note 94.
215. Some observers have recommended promulgation of uniform procedures to aid
federal district courts in adjudicating attorney misconduct. See, e.g., Franck Proposal,
supra note 6, at 30-32. Such procedures are undesirable for two reasons. First, federal
district courts currently have procedures for adjudicating attorney misconduct. Several, for
example, have adopted the ABA's Model FederalRules of DisciplinaryEnforcement. ABA
Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline & Center for Professional Discipline, Model
Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement (Feb. 14, 1978). Second, requiring or even recommending adoption of uniform rules would lessen the likelihood of judicial support for
the use of federal district courts to adjudicate claims of attorney misconduct before federal
agencies.
216. Congress should amend the Agency Practice Act by redesignating § 500(f) as
§ 500(g) and enacting the following language as new § 500():
(1) Except as provided by this subsection, no agency shall be authorized, two
years after the effective date of this subsection, to adopt standards of conduct for
persons qualified by subsection (b) or to impose discipline thereon for violation of
any such standards.
(A) No agency shall promulgate standards of conduct for persons qualified by
subsection (b) except as provided by 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-404 and by the reg-
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tion, all disciplinary action taken, whether by the agency itself or
ulations adopted by the Office of Personnel Management in implementation
thereof;
(B) An agency may discipline a person qualified by subsection (b) for conduct
proscribed by the standards adopted pursuant to paragraph (A) above to the
extent required to maintain order in or the integrity of a proceeding, provided
the discipline imposed by the agency does not continue past the duration of
the proceeding;
(C) An agency may conduct a reciprocity proceeding as provided in subsection (b) above; and
(D) Nothing in this subsection affects the authority of a State to regulate an
individual described in subsection (b) above or of an agency which has express statutory authority (or which may be granted express statutory authority) to adopt standards of conduct for persons qualified by subsection (b)
above, and to impose discipline thereon for violation of standards adopted
under the agency's express statutory authority.
(2) In all other instances the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction
to impose discipline on persons qualified under subsection (b) above for conduct
proscribed by standards adopted pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) above.
(A) Allegations of proscribed conduct committed by a person qualified under
subsection (b) above shall be presented by the agency to the court under seal
with accompanying documents; the court shall determine in camera whether
substantial evidence of proscribed conduct has been presented by the agency
so as to warrant continuation of the proceeding. If the proceeding is not continued, the allegations and accompanying documents shall remain nonpublic
and the proceeding shall be terminated. If the court determines that substantial evidence of proscribed conduct exists, the proceeding shall continue according to rules prescribed by the court. The burden shall be on the agency to
sustain the allegation of proscribed conduct. If the court finds clear and convincing evidence that proscribed conduct has occurred, the court shall disbar,
suspend, place on probation, or reprimand the person who has committed the
proscribed conduct and may assess against that same person the costs of the
proceeding, as well as order restitution to persons financially injured by the
proscribed conduct, or both.
(B) The action may be brought in the district court of the United States for
the district where the agency has its principal office; the conduct occurred; the
person qualified by subsection (b) above maintains an office; the person qualified by subsection (b) above resides; or the person qualified by subsection (b)
above is licensed to practice law. The court shall consider a request by the
person against whom an action is filed for a change of venue. Review of discipline imposed by a federal district court under this subsection shall be in the
appropriate United States court of appeals.
If Congress decides to apply the standards of conduct adopted pursuant to amended
§ 500(f)(l)(A) not only to attorneys practicing before federal agencies but also to government attorneys, see supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text & note 207, it should add
the following language to amended § 500(f)(2)(A):
If the person alleged to have committed proscribed conduct is an employee or
member of an agency, the complaint shall be made to the director of the Office of
Government Ethics (or his designate), who shall assume responsibility for
presenting the allegation of proscribed conduct and accompanying documents to
the court and, if the proceeding is not terminated by the court, of presenting the
case in chief.
The above change would also require amendment of Title IV, Ethics in Government Act, 5
U.S.C. app. §§ 401-04 (1982). See supra note 159.
In regard to the suggested amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 500(f)(2)(A), the administrative
law standard of "substantial evidence" is more appropriate for the preliminary evaluation
of evidence of proscribed conduct than the criminal law standard of "probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed" applicable to preliminary examinations. See
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through the courts (except for reciprocity hearings), must be directly related to an alleged violation of the established standards
of attorney conduct.2"'
V.

CONCLUSION

Effective regulation of attorneys practicing before federal
agencies must address three separate aspects: admission requirements, standards of conduct, and disciplinary action. Longstanding, consistent precedent, both congressional and judicial, support
the conclusion that Congress has authority to regulate attorneys

practicing before federal agencies.21 8 In exercising this authority,
Congress has set a single admission requirement for practice
before federal agencies.2 1 9 Congress has not, however, adequately
addressed the other two aspects of attorney regulation-standards
and discipline. Although extensive misconduct by attorneys
before federal agencies has not been documented to date, widespread inconsistencies in standards22 0 and disciplinary mechanisms 22 between the states, federal agencies, and other federal
authorities expose attorneys to uncertain and conflicting potential
liability.
Through amendment of the Agency Practice Act, Congress
should delegate authority to promulgate uniform standards of
conduct to an existing federal agency. Neither Congress nor the
judiciary can provide the resources and apolitical atmosphere necessary to produce comprehensive and objective standards. In contrast, the Office of Government Ethics, currently under a broad
congressional mandate to provide general guidance, standards of
conduct, and advice to federal agencies, appears both equipped
and appropriate to accept the specific task of promulgating uniform standards of conduct for attorneys practicing before federal
agencies.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. l(a). "Clear and convincing evidence" is the standard most frequently
applied in attorney disciplinary proceedings to determine whether proscribed conduct has
been committed. 7A C.J.S.Attorney & Client § 103 (1980).
217. Presumably, these would include both the uniform standards and any additional
standards promulgated by an individual agency and approved by the Office of Personnel
Management. See supra note 159.
218. See supra notes 31-32.
219. See 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1982); supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text. Only the
Patent and Trademark Office's admission requirements differ. See id. at § 500(e).
220. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text. Much of the confusion stems from
ambiguous delegations of authority by Congress. See supra notes 113-43 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
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Congress also should amend the Agency Practice Act to provide for a uniform disciplinary process. Except for attorney misconduct affecting only the integrity of a particular agency
proceeding,22 2 the agencies themselves are inappropriate disciplinary bodies. An agency responsible for both initiating and adjudicating charges of alleged attorney misconduct faces high risks of
bias and conflict of interest. Furthermore, allowing each agency
to discipline its own practitioners perpetuates the lack of uniformity among different agencies.
The federal district courts, currently vested with the authority
to adjudicate attorney misconduct in general, are well-suited to
adjudicate alleged violations of uniform standards of conduct for
practice before federal agencies. The district courts would not be
overburdened with a large caseload increase and would afford accused practitioners an unbiased and familar forum in which to be
heard. Until Congress expressly defines agency responsibilities relating to standards of conduct and discipline, the controversy between the bar and federal agencies on these matters is unlikely to
disappear. The recommendations suggested above22 3 balance the
concerns of attorneys and federal agencies, and also reflect a regard for the public's right to effective regulation of attorneys practicing in the federal administrative process.
222. Federal agencies also should retain authority to conduct reciprocity hearings. See
supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 83, 94, 159, & 216.
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A

Federal Questionnaire
Survey: Discipline of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal
Agencies
This Survey of twenty (20) questions is intended to aid in making
a recommendation to the Administrative Conference of the
United States on issues relating to discipline of attorneys practicing before federal agencies. RESPONSE TO THIS SURVEY IS
VOLUNTARY. You are probably aware that the American Bar
Association and other groups and individuals are addressing
themselves to the need for more effective control over attorneys
practicing before federal agencies and to the problems raised by
attorneys whose practice brings them into contact with forums
other than the state of their original admission. This has raised
questions of, inter alia, whether there should be uniform standards
of professional conduct for attorneys practicing before federal
agencies (above and beyond the Code of Professional Responsibility) and whether current disciplinary procedures are adequate.
This Survey is designed to obtain your reactions and opinions on
issues related to these questions and to obtain information derived
from your experience with respect to the issues involved. Please
feel free to comment on any matter related to the subject of inquiry even if the issue is not presented by a specific question.
Requirementsfor Admission to Practice
1. Should attorneys practicing before your agency be subject to
admission requirements beyond those required by "The Agency
Practice Act," 5 U.S.C. § 500, i.e., should the Act be amended?
Yes
No __
2. If additional admission requirements were imposed, what
type of requirements (if any) would be appropriate with regard to
your agency? PLEASE EXPLAIN ON SEPARATE SHEET.
Standardsof ProfessionalConduct
3. Has your agency promulgated particularized standards of
practice relating to professional conduct?
Yes
(Please explain on separate sheet)
No
4. If your agency does NOT have particularized standards, do
you think they would be desirable for your agency?
Yes
No
Question
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_

5. If your agency DOES have particularized standards, do you
think they are desirable?
Question
No __
Yes __
_
Not Applicable
6. If particularized standards exist [or were to be promulgated]
for your agency, what considerations require [would require] your
agency to impose particularized standards? PLEASE EXPLAIN
ON SEPARATE SHEET.
7. Should different professional standards apply depending on
whether the alleged misconduct arises out of a direct appearance
before an agency (e.g., actually appearing before the agency; filing
a document the contents of which were prepared by the attorney;
and the like) or does not arise out of a direct appearance (e.g.,
failure to "blow the whistle" on a corporate decision)?
No
Yes
8. Should uniform standards of professional conduct for federal
agency practice be promulgated?
(Please answer Questions 9
No __
Yes __
& 10, even if you answered
No)
9. By whom should any such uniform standards of professional
conduct for federal agency practice be promulgated?
Congress
Federal Courts
ABA __
_
Ad Hoc Group (Attorneys)
Ad Hoc Group (Agency Personnel)
Ad Hoc Group (Attorneys/Agency Personnel)
(please explain on separate sheet)
Other
10. Should any agencies be exempted from any such uniform
standards of professional conduct for federal agency practice?
No __
(Please explain on separate sheet)
Yes __
Attorney Discioline
11. Do you feel that current procedures used by your agency effectively process and resolve misconduct by attorneys practicing
before your agency?
(Please explain on separate sheet)
Yes __
No __
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12. How does your agency process complaints against attorneys
practicing before your agency?
Forward to Licensing State
In-House Agency Proceedings
Other
(Please explain on separate sheet)
13. Are you in favor of the creation of a centralized federal authority to handle discipline of attorneys practicing before federal
agencies?
Yes _
No
(Please answer Questions
14-17, even if you answered No)
14. Whom should such a centralized authority use to screen and
investigate a complaint arising out of misconduct before your
agency?
US Attorney
Your Agency
Licensing Bar Counsel
Federal Magistrate
Federal Judge __
The Centralized Authority
Other
(Please explain on separate sheet)
_

_

15. Whom should such a centralized authority use to dispose of
a screened/investigated complaint arising out of misconduct
before your agency, to include imposing discipline (if
appropriate)?
US Attorney
Your Agency
Licensing Bar Counsel
Federal Magistrate
Specially Designated ALJ_
Federal Judge
The Centralized Authority
Other
(Please explain on separate sheet)
_

16. Should any agencies be exempted from such a centralized
authority for attorney discipline?
Yes __
(Please explain on separate sheet)
No
17. Should attorneys sanctioned (e.g., suspension, disbarment)
for misconduct before your agency be similarly restricted in their
practice before all federal agencies?
Under a centralized federal authority approach:
Yes
No
Under an agency-by-agency approach:
Yes __ No Under a state licensing authority approach: Yes __ No 18.

With respect to your agency, misconduct by attorneys arises:
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Regularly
Occasionally
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Periodically
Almost Never

19. Approximately how many instances of attorney misconduct
(of such a nature as to warrant sanction) occur annually before
; Are the attorneys involved generally sancyour agency?
(Please explain on separate sheet)
tioned? Yes
No
20. What types of misconduct occur most frequently before your
agency? PLEASE EXPLAIN ON SEPARATE SHEET.
Name of Agency

Position Held

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Please return this
Survey (and additional pages needed for explanation) by June 15,
1982, in the self-addressed envelope provided.

Sincerely,
Michael P. Cox
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B
State Questionnaire
Survey
APPENDIX

This Survey of eleven (11) questions is intended to aid in making
a recommendation to the Administrative Conference of the
United States (5 U.S.C. §§ 571-576) on issues relating to discipline of attorneys practicing before federal agencies. RESPONSE
TO THIS SURVEY IS VOLUNTARY. The information being
solicited is not available from the National Center for Professional Responsibility (and other sources contacted). You are
probably aware that the American Bar Association and other
groups and individuals are addressing themselves to the need for
more effective control over attorneys practicing before federal
agencies and to the problems raised by attorneys whose practice
brings them into contact with forums other than the state of their
original admission. This has raised questions of, inter alia,
whether there should be uniform standards of professional conduct for attorneys practicing before federal agencies (above and
beyond the Code of Professional Responsibility) and whether current disciplinary procedures are adequate. This Survey is
designed to obtain information with respect to the issues involved.
Please feel free to comment on any matter related to the subject of
inquiry even if the issue is not presented by a specific question.
1. You have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney
licensed to practice by your State, without regard to whether misconduct occurs within or without your State.
True __
False __
(Please explain on separate sheet).
2. You only have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney licensed to practice by your State for a violation of a standard adopted by some official body (e.g., court, legislature, bar
association) of your State.
True __
False __
(Please explain on separate sheet).
3. You have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney
NOT licensed to practice by your State (but who has her/his principal office in your State) for misconduct which occurs without
your State.
True
False
.
4.

You have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney
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NOT licensed to practice by your State for misconduct which occurs within your State.
False
True 5. If you have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney NOT licensed to practice by your State for misconduct, which
occurs within your State, the investigation, discipline, etc. would
be for a violation of a standard adopted by
The Licensing State
Your State
(Please explain on separate sheet)
Other __
Both __
Question Not Applicable
6. If you have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney NOT licensed to practice by your State (but who has her/his
principal office in your State) for misconduct which occurs without
your State, the investigation would be for a violation of a standard
adopted by
The Licensing State
Your State _
Occurred
Misconduct
Where
State
The
(Please explain on separate sheet)
Other
Question Not Applicable
_

7. Does your State realistically have the interest, resources, etc.
to pursue [pursue vigorously?] misconduct relating to federal
agencies committed within your State by attorneys licensed to
practice by your State?
(Please explain on separate sheet)
No
Yes
8. Does your State realistically have the interest, resources, etc.
to pursue [pursue vigorously?] misconduct relating to federal
agencies committed without your State by attorneys licensed to
practice by your State?
(Please explain on separate sheet)
No __
Yes __
9. If you have authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney NOT licensed to practice by your State,
a. does your State realistically have the interest, resources,
etc. to pursue [pursue vigorously?] misconduct relating to federal agencies committed within your State by attorneys NOT
licensed to practice by your State?
(Please explain on separate sheet)
No __
Yes
Question Not Applicable
b. does your State realistically have the interest, resources,
etc. to pursue [pursue vigorously?] misconduct relating to fed-
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eral agencies committed without your State by an attorney
NOT licensed to practice by your State (but who has her/his
principal office in your State)?
Yes
No
(Please explain on separate sheet)
Question Not Applicable
.
10. Does your State have reciprocal discipline arrangements
with:
a. other states?
Yes
(Please explain on separate sheet); No ___.
b. federal agencies?
Yes __
(Please explain on separate sheet); No.
11. In addition to answering the ten (10) general questions,
above, information is solicited on the number and disposition of
complaints you have received in recent years relating to federal
agencies. [The time period is left to your discretion, but at least
the past five years is desirable.] Obviously, the names (or other
identifying particulars) of the individuals involved are not being
sought but rather "anonymous" data, to include, if possible, items
of information such as: year, source of the complaint (e.g., private
source or SEC, Treasury, Army JAGC, or the like), nature of the
complaint, and the disposition/sanction (if any) imposed. The
format, below, is suggested for the data:
Date
Source
Nature of
Disposition/Sanction
Complaint
Private
Public
(continue on additional sheet(s) if required)
Name of State

Position Held

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Please return this
Survey (and additional pages needed for explanation) as soon as
possible, but not later than June 28, 1982, in the self-addressed
envelope provided.
Sincerely,
Michael P. Cox
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